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#### Summary:

This research problematizes the application of [society] as concept and following a metaphorical 'displacement' of homeless people by narrating three stories by homeless men. The premise that alleged [exclusion] requires the application of an alleged knowable and fixed space - namely [society] - and that such a negative descriptive is *de facto* constitutive of [society] will be elaborated in this research. In this theoretical and explorative study in which among other Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida will be consulted, U.S. literature on biopolitics and homelessness is compared to Dutch practices and *inter alia* a rather literal take from some U.S. scholars on Foucault's biopolitical notion of 'letting die' is problematized and compared to less radical problems in European (post-)welfarestates: a relevant problem in this research is the belief in the manageability of persistent problems surrounding homeless people. The author is on the one hand applying liberal humanistic ideals, operationalized in for example a dialogical and open attitude towards homelessness but on the other hand comes to terms throughout this study with biopolitical developments, such as an increasing criminalization of homelessness.

Throughout this work its research and its writings will be perpetually considered performative acts and as such scrutinized. Therefore this research has an unconventional approach at times.

Keywords: Biopolitics, Neoliberalism, Foucault, Homelessness, Integration, Inclusion, Society.

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[Exclusion] by [Inclusion]?

*About the Problem of Idée Fixe*  
*[Society] as Foundational Body*

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Artwork on previous page: 'Anomalia 3', part 3 of series 'Anomalia 1-3', by Meri Kauhanen.

*'What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not preparing – with a rather shaky hand – a labyrinth into which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to your bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.'*

Michel Foucault.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Foucault, M. 2005. P.19.

*'Ultimately, everything has to do with everything.'*

Jules Deelder.



*"I ain't lookin' to compete with you  
Beat or cheat or mistreat you  
Simplify you, classify you  
Deny, defy or crucify you  
(...)*

*I don't want to straight-face you  
Race or chase you, track or trace you  
Or disgrace you or displace you  
Or define you or confine you  
(...)*

*No, and I ain't lookin' to fight with you  
Frighten you or tighten you  
Drag you down or drain you down  
Chain you down or bring you down  
(...)*

*I don't want to meet your kin  
Make you spin or do you in  
Or select you or dissect you  
Or inspect you or reject you  
(....)*

*I ain't lookin' to block you up  
Shock or knock or lock you up  
Analyze you, categorize you  
Finalize you or advertise you  
(...)*

*I don't want to fake you out  
Take or shake or forsake you out  
I ain't lookin' for you to feel like me  
See like me or be like me''<sup>2</sup>*

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<sup>2</sup> Dylan, Bob. 2003. Another side of Bob Dylan. 'All I really want to do'. New York: Columbia Records. Sony entertainment.

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## Chapter 1: introductions

### § 1.1 premisses and research question

Premise 0: [Society] is a myth. (Schinkel, 2008). As such it cannot observe [itself]; but [it] nevertheless assumes [it] can, and attempts so manically.

Premise 1: Alleged [in- and exclusion] requires the application of an alleged knowable and fixed space - for example, and commonly objectified as – [society].

Premise 2: [society] and [normality] are normalizing<sup>3</sup> discourses.

Premise 3: There are, and will always be, people whom are comparatively less skilled and gifted than others to have a productive life.

Premise 4: Social work will improve by not focusing too analytically how to improve social work.

The question in this research is:

Are welfare policies to 'include' homeless people counterproductive?<sup>4</sup>

### §1.2. introduction

Three narratives about homeless men problematize the readiness of the Dutch legal system and welfare organizations to describe '(dis-)placement' of homeless people. Thereafter the premise

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<sup>3</sup> According to Foucault a '*normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation.*' (Foucault, M. 2003. p.253).

<sup>4</sup> This question is at the same time a 'liberal' and a 'neoliberal biopolitical' question. A question without boundaries in order to measure alleged 'inclusion' as productive manifests in itself a certain naïvity of the author regarding the far-fetching, one might even say overwhelming implications of contemporary neoliberal biopolitics (Alt, 2014). At the end of this research the stress between liberalism and neoliberalism ought to be disentangled. We have chosen to continue with this in a way too unclear question because it will by default need to consider liberalism and neoliberalism. Therefore we proceed initially naïve. Secondly it is not clear what (counter-)productive means; Such a stance needs a quantitative or qualitative scale for measurement; To ask such an unclear question without a scope of measurement is by default too 'wide'. There will be no quantitative research be conducted, and the insights on this research has an explorative qualitative character, but the problem of this research' design will not be solved. In the conclusion we will reconsider this problem.

This naïvity is not feigned; there has been a lack of an awareness of the depths of biopower and it's implications at the beginning of this research, and as such this work, in its naïvity, is a *real* research as that throughout the period of the writing of this work the perspectives of the author have changed. See as well §1.4.



that alleged [exclusion] requires the application of an alleged knowable and fixed space - namely [society] - will be explained. This research questions if there can possibly exist a constitutive element of [society], if not a negative constitution - an abyss. It will critically claim that the apparent [exclusion] from [society] is epistemologically weak but nevertheless productive, namely that [society] works as incentive and [fundament] to apply an analytical grid which serves as rationale for the sanctioning of so to say abnormal or deviant life. [Inclusion] and the sanctioning of abnormal life will be considered as two sides of the same coin; [Inclusion] serves as incentive to influence - and hence in neoliberal biopolitical systems sanction - unproductive people. [Society] as concept needs to be scrutinized in order to research its workings. Critical attitudes for social workers and other professionals will be briefly considered as a nuance of a persistent description of [society] might be part of more sensitive, gentle and immanent approaches to the problems and disabilities of homeless people. Throughout this work its research and its writings will be perpetually considered performative acts and as such scrutinized.<sup>5</sup> Therefore this research has at times an unconventional approach.

### § 1.3 relevance

On May 31th 2017 the Netherlands national news agency published an extensive article about contemporary homelessness in The Netherlands.<sup>6</sup> According to Dutch Salvation Army representative Diana Nieuwold shelters for homeless in The Netherlands are overcrowded as there is currently not enough capacity to shelter all homeless people in the country.<sup>7</sup> The scarcity of cheap housing

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<sup>5</sup> To avoid logical auto-confirmations the research aims to critically scrutinize itself; likely a devious, pretentious and contentious intention which could still suffer from contemporary circular logics nevertheless.

<sup>6</sup> Source: <http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2175879-ook-ij-kan-in-een-vingerknip-dakloos-worden.html>, consulted on 14.06.2017.

<sup>7</sup> This statement indicates The Netherlands does not have a 'house first' policy, as is applied in Finland for example; 'Housing First means ending homelessness instead of managing it. The basic idea is to offer permanent housing and needs-based support for homeless people instead of temporary accommodation in hostels or in emergency shelters. Permanent housing means an independent rental flat with own rental contract.' Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2017/mar/22/finland-solved-homelessness-eu-crisis-housing-first>, and <https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2016/sep/14/lessons-from-finland-helping-homeless-housing-model-homes>, consulted on 18.08.2017. My take why only Finland applies a 'housing first' policy is that it contradicts neoliberal policymaking common elsewhere in the European Union. For example, the housingmarket in The Netherlands has been liberalized throughout last decade, and a 'house first' policy would be contradicting with the liberal, and overstrained, real estate market.

I could not find any relevant information about what happens to illegal homeless people within the 'house first' policy in Finland, as I assume homeless illegal people might cause legal and organizational problems and that therefore the housing-first only applies to people with a Finnish social security number. As well newsarticles such as the quoted Guardian articles do not refer to problematic phenomena of homeless people

accommodations is the reason for the current rise in homelessness in the Netherlands according to Nieuwold. The article mentions that basically everybody has a chance to become homeless in case somebody is exposed to bad luck and is not able to tackle emerging problems promptly. Additionally, substance addictions, mental health problems and depressions, divorces, deaths of relatives and economic problems are considered risk factors for homelessness. The recommendations of the Dutch Salvation Army to tackle homelessness are on the one hand a plea for more and cheaper housing facilities but as well a call for more prevention: *"The municipalities, housing corporations and welfare agencies must work well together. As soon as a housing corporation signals that the rent is not paid or there are complaints about the resident there should be immediate intervention. There should be good arrangements between the involved parties. What we (FN: The Netherlands Salvation Army) would like to see is that people can live in social housing apartments. And if the problem case (sic.) refuses necessary help, a housing corporation has an incentive to intervene: 'you (FN: a problematic resident) live in our' apartment so we can force you to accept professional help.' We need better collaboration and coordination to prevent more people from being on the streets."* (Translated by author). Many people probably underscore such incentives, because who would like to live in dire circumstances without 'a roof'? However, I aim to show homelessness and related issues are not as easily tackled as there might be some initially unforeseen side effects that problematize such activist, steadfast and positivist endeavors.

#### §.1.4 about the style and method of the research

The forthcoming research is twofold; The narrating practical illustrations serve to disentangle a philosophical and biopolitical problem. Ideally and hopefully the opposite will be the case too; that a philosophical and biopolitical research will shed another light on the problem of the description of an imaginary 'placement' of homelessness in – or usually 'outside' – [society].<sup>8</sup> Between these two aims a fold might exist that comprises a relevant aspect for the forthcoming research; namely a fold that will be a scrutiny to the research's own style and reasonability.

The style of the research is important as it constitutes its reason; an unusual and free style will allow us to postpone commonly applied concepts such as [society], because *'the tranquility*

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who persistently resist care, as for example the three men described in §1.7.

<sup>8</sup> To inquire the limits of the reasonability of a description of (society) as obvious might be relevant for social science and -policy, even if it would function only as an admonition.

with which (it is) accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction (of) rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized. (...) Should we regard them as illusions, illegitimate constructions, or ill-acquired results? Should we never make use of them, even as a temporary support, and never provide them with a definition? What we must do, in fact, is to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence, and to free the problems that they pose; to recognize that they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which other questions (concerning their structure, coherence, systematicity, transformations) may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster of questions.' (Foucault, 1972. P.28, 29). Foucault mentioned in his debate with Chomsky the importance to 'criticize the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.' (Chomsky, N. 2006. P.64). Although I believe an increase of knowledge about homelessness and their related problems might rebut some persistent popular held assumptions about it<sup>9</sup> - and that such a nuance could help to describe homelessness differently - I would like to investigate and problematize mostly, after Foucaults instruction, what is constituting the rationality of the discourses on homelessness and, moreover, what 'falls outside' of that discourse.

In order to steadfastly recall to the stress between the complex, open and multiple, and a spatialized research I apply an alternative for a [defined topic] as core instrument in forthcoming research. I apply a mythical but nevertheless relevant aspect of my research as *bracketed* instead of having it defined. (Schinkel, 2008). Brackets symbolize the '*enclosed matter [...] in logic as sign of aggregation.*'<sup>10</sup> I assume it is of key importance in my research to consider how a '*group, body or mass is composed of many distinct parts*'<sup>11</sup> and how '*units or parts (are) collected into a mass or*

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<sup>9</sup> For example statements such as: 'it's a (lifestyle) choice to be homeless'. See for example the Guardians March 10<sup>th</sup> 2016 article 'It's not a lifestyle choice': homelessness on the streets of Manchester'. Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/10/homelessness-streets-manchester-outreach-rough-sleepers-housing>, consulted on 22.05.2017.

<sup>10</sup> Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bracket>, consulted on 16.02.2017

<sup>11</sup> Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation>, consulted on 16.02.2017. Source: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation>

whole<sup>12 13</sup> while it recognizes in the meanwhile *'the condition of being so collected.'*<sup>14</sup> In other words, the brackets warn us that the aggregation is a human product of composition and exclusion. They remind us other compositions might have been possible as well. The brackets recollect that something is left outside those while the apparent unity or connector of 'the object', [for example society], between the brackets might rely just on those brackets, and that therefore the brackets, [ ], so to say disguise an abyss or hollow.

Secondly the brackets serve another purpose, namely to discuss the workings of [the topic] while the actual evaluation of the alleged 'sub-stance' or 'es-sense' of [it] is postponed or even evaded. This works alike Husserl's phenomenological method in which *'scientific, cultural and philosophical prejudices'* (Farina, G. 2014. P. 53) are postponed in order to focus on the analysis of *'historically constructed conceptions.'* (Ibid.). In order to describe the meaning and inclinations of [topic] I aim to move around [it] and possibly disentangle its workings. [It] even might be problematized in a manner that [the topic] disappears once it is scrutinized thoroughly; that [it] functions like a myth. (Schinkel, 2008).

People whom are apparently problematic are often and readily described as being [outside of society]. (Schinkel, 2008). Such a description could apply to people in jail, asylum seekers, immigrants, homeless people but as well handicapped people, people in 'low' social economic classes, (ex-)inmates, criminals, mentally ill people, women, homosexuals, jobless, handicapped people, elderly, illiterate people, children or even people-who-do-not-use-computers, in other words: everything and everybody who can be considered as 'social pathology'. (Schinkel, 2007). These people have to [integrate], and in speaking, writing and thinking about [integration] an artificial distinction as performative act is maintained between [society] and [outside society]. (Oostdijk, E & L. Ten Kate, 2010). The problem of this kind of 'placement' or spatializing in/out of [society] will be investigated in the forthcoming research because of the free and uncritical application of [inclusion] -

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<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> In this research I considered to apply the philosophical term meriology as the study of the parts and the wholes they form. I have studied Husserl's 'On the Theory of Wholes and Parts.' (1970). However, I found Husserl's content particularly difficult to apply in my casestudy, and secondly I consider the idea of 'whole' problematic. Therefore I will not use the term meriology in this research.

<sup>14</sup> Source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation>, consulted on 16.02.2017. Source: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation>

[exclusion] or [inclusion] - [society] binary mechanisms in contemporary European political discourses.<sup>15</sup>

Such a scrutinizing approach implies I do not assume there exists an unmediated and unproblematic relation between linguistic signs and the signified: I do not assume that words point out unequivocally and unproblematically the social reality, but after Foucault I consider [society] as discourse; as *'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (...) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe.'* (Foucault, 1972. P. 54). In order to reveal such 'more', what falls besides common discourse about [society] and [integration] and describe how an allegedly [inclusive] mechanism might frustrate, and therefore [exclude] I apply a critical and slow approach. According to Foucault scientific discourses are such complex forms that scientists ought to approach them not only on various levels but as well with different means. (1973). Different theories will be combined and connected to my own work experience in a shelter for homeless people described as narrative illustrations.

One of the tasks of philosophy is to reflect on the conditions of knowledge production in scientific disciplines. Within a philosophical approach one could research certain scientific requirements, for example 'objectivity', and consider critically why they are allegedly objective or certain: Why and how do I apply certain stipulations, plans, layouts and executions for scientific research? Philosophy is not a regular normal scientific discipline with *a priori* instructions and therefore it has agility regarding its method and researched areas. I apply a philosophical approach as some persistent underlying assumptions about homelessness are to be scrutinized. Form and content are equally important to achieve that: When I perform a certain statement I simultaneously investigate choices about the design of the research, as I have for example already considered the ordinary<sup>16</sup> applications of a certain word problematic. Due to its metareflective style the forthcoming exercise

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<sup>15</sup> In this research we will not focus on 'marginalized groups' as that is not an interesting and relevant theoretical research. As such we do not a priori aim to defend or 'liberate' the *underdog* in (society) in a Gramscian or in other words neomarxist attempt to overcome or at least palliate the suffering of the 'oppressed'. Such an uncritical binary between oppressor and oppressed is to be critized; If one engages with the excluded one acknowledges ex- or implicitly that (in)- and (exclusion) is a crucial distinction. (Schinkel, 2007. P. 456). Schinkel pleads for a critical stance which problematizes the frame of which applies an essential distinction between suppressor and suppressed. (Ibid.). Foucaults notion of power as 'the mobile ground of plural power relations' as described in 'The Will to Knowledge' chapter 'method' will be applied in this research. (1985).

<sup>16</sup> With ordinary I mean in this context uncritical, and with uncritical a lack of self- and methodological scrutiny.

might appear as 'slow', or as even going around in loops; Some descriptions are apparent obviousness's which are in my approach - maybe annoyingly - repeating themselves. Loops appear to bring us *nowhere* or I might end up exactly on the same spot as started. But hopefully this style works as loophole: that in the slowly moving and scrutinizing of its own style the content transforms and appears in another light, possibly as anomaly. I hope to be able to show that something can be achieved with such a (dis-)orderly endeavor and that a certain boldness regarding its scientific merit might be appropriate and useful, and could maybe even fun and interesting. However, I am not that bald. I think there is at least a tacit legacy of a logical positivist approach<sup>17</sup> in western universities. I feel I ought to tribute with this research to sciences and [societies] in general. I ought to serve readers in particular by creating an eloquent and logical exposé about a clearly and logically defined, delimited<sup>18</sup> and relevant researchtopic concluded with applicable results. I feel I am not able to fulfill such an imperative however, at least not directly. A command for relevancy, clarity and especially applicability namely imply that the outcomes of the research will be useful – and one should in such case take into account useful to whom or to what? - and that a researchtopic can be defined. In case applicability prevails in a research it probably means it is designed for a certain purpose, with a practical goal in mind. In such an approach there is an apparent consensus about what 'the problem' is, and moreover that it can be solved as well. I am worried that the powers resolving [a topic], for example who describes it as a problem and how such is done, is not critically examined in such an applied research.<sup>19</sup> In other words there seems consensus about or within a certain discourse. The frame of the research is apparently given, the direction of the research is ostensibly evident and clear. I do not want to accept certain descriptions, though they might be considered to be 'self-evident'. Its self-evidence functions alike autopoiesis<sup>20</sup> or, even better, as an autopoietic machine. (Maturana, H.R. & F.J. Varela. 1972). In other words, by the acceptance of a description it starts to function as such; the application is an performative act.<sup>21</sup>

Homeless people and the resolving problems apparently aren't easily 'grasped'. Hence I believe a

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<sup>17</sup> With a tacit legacy of a logical positivist approach I mean science which describes cases which are empirically observable and verifiable.

<sup>18</sup> In delimiting the quality of the work will become apparent as the difficulty of good research lies in making decisions about the scope of it. What kind of premises and definitions are applied? What is essential in the research and what should be left out?

<sup>19</sup> Scientific disciplines can rely on a assumption which will not be fundamentally questioned within that discipline. As long a phase of normal science is productive there is no need for fundamental research which might lead to a scientific revolution. (Kuhn, 1977).

<sup>20</sup> Schinkel (2007) and Foucault. (2001).

clear positioning of the research question within a certain discipline, a timeframe and a space does not function well; but moreover such an imperative *is* exactly the problem! So this research is not alike a puzzle where the last pieces are put in the right place; I does not know what the puzzle or picture will look like, if the pieces are compatible or if there are some pieces missing, (probably!), if the fragments will ever be fitting into a finalized state, and if there is a frame in the first place. Hence I think that to start - or to end a research as that is concerned with this work – is actually more like merging or tuning in into open and interminable processes and discussions consisting of different and fluctuating histories, various geographical places, languages, work fields and scientific disciplines. However, a contemporary quick fix<sup>22</sup> to label unclear academic endeavors and -projects

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<sup>21</sup>As I disagree with this framing I will persistently avoid to mention it. Schinkel mentions that people are only excluded from society the moment people start talking about [integration]; it is a performative act. (2005).

Perpetually I have been considering if I should start this study with narrative case studies and 'zoom' from there 'out' to theoretical approaches or if I should start with a philosophical and sociological analysis and move from there to practices. After ample deliberation and a lot of shuf-pling of different paragraphs I decided to explain instead why my style is (hopefully, but at least mostly initially) so indecisive while I wont further bother you with the chicken or egg alike question if theory or practice ought to deliberated first: I will blend theoretical insights with practice based narratives. I mingle theories and narratives as I believe a singular focus on either will not have the argumentative strength I aim for in this research. Form and content are equally important. There is not really a clear cut distinction between the two even, as they are reciprocally constituted. A focus on either two will just not do as I intend to 'catch' things which are 'not fitting in' into either approach. Therefore I bid for your willingness to accept the unconventional styles and changes between of the one hand creativity and on the other hand 'knowledge' in this research. It has been as if the research topic was buzzing inside my body for years: The incessant variations in dimensions caused the buzz. If I assumed to 'catch' the issue through this way, the problem appears 'elsewhere'. If I 'highlighted' or 'underscored' something the verges and the limitedness of that 'grabbed' appeared, whereas the problems were beyond. In case a pivot point is highlighted the actual pivotal point appeared elsewhere. If verges do exist (that is to be found out yet) be-tween different descriptions than I want to investigate those verges. You might have noticed that spatial descriptions are quite persistent in (my) language. Hu-mans, and our descriptions, are apparently going 'higher' and 'under', we are next to a verge, there are 'subs', we can be in a center, on a margin, in a periphery, above or below, and a pivot is rotating. Why do spatial descriptions appear so persistent in my writing and in the descriptions of our organizations and our life's? Is this the best I can do to describe my problem? What if there is no solid ground, no fixed space, and no hierarchical order? My issue is similar to Deleuze and Guattari's whom cried out loud we have suffered enough from arborescent trees! (1987). How to spatialize – how to bracket - the problem of spatialization? What to compare it with then? Can you do science without comparisons?

Braidotti mentions about her style of writing that a *'philosophy which aims to think otherwise about 'difference' will use a different style than usual. (...) Form and content reflect one another. The search for new views and figurations imply to explore different styles. (This) approach is therefore anything but lineair, but full of rizomatic facets. Such makes the notion of 'style' of major importance. Style is an essential tool for the philosophers task' to create new configurations and concepts. Style is more than a rhetorical appliance because it makes the unthinkable thinkable and the unimaginable conceivable. Knowledge and creativity (non-italics by FN) is needed for such an endeavour, but as well the freedom to break away from established patterns of thought (...) and sterile protocols of academic discourse.'* (Braidotti, 2004. P. 7).

<sup>22</sup> Such an approach does not really investigate but accepts the problematic situation for what it is. Sloterdijk considers such an attitude intellectual defeatism. *'Philosophical thought has always tried to tell us who we are and what we should do; (...) Whoever finds this ambition outlandish should consider that while it is certainly provocative to assert it, it would be an act of intellectual defeatism to abandon it.'* (Sloterdijk, 2013. P.3). I do not claim to solve the incommensurabilityproblem, nor solve the problem in my research, but that does not mean we should not talk about



as inter- or multidisciplinary does not do. In multi- or interdisciplinarity resonates the problem of incommensurability as described by Kuhn. (1977).<sup>23</sup> Incommensurability is often illustrated with the use of a story about six blind humans who have to describe an elephant, as they are blind, by touch: One person holds the elephant's proboscis and describes what she feels as something like a snake. Another feels the tusk and describes it to be like a spear. A third person touches the leg and considers it a tree, etcetera. (Denzin, N.K. & M.D. Giardina. 2008). The bottom line is that every blind person describes, as metaphor for a scientist, the 'world' according to what they 'feel', in other words, through their own paradigm. Denzin & Giardina claim that the blind humans and elephant story teaches us that humans '*can never know the true nature of things. We are each blinded by our own perspective. Truth is always partial, fractured, contested, performed.*' (Ibid. P. 29). Though this illustrates the incommensurability problem well, the allegory implies – and needs – the very existence of the elephant! Therefore Denzin & Giardina can apply the *elephant* and '*the truth*' in the same paragraph. (Ibid.) What if the blind people were for example touching some body parts representing an elephant used in a stage play where there is no actual whole elephant: that their constitutive descriptions make an experience of a 'true' 'elephant'. I problematize the story about six blind humans and the elephant because the story and its adherents ignored that the object of the research could be constructed by the very research!

I am writing and researching so to write *in medias res*, in the middle of actions, because there is no real nor fixed starting point or demarcated research topic and probably no end point of research either. In other words, I consider the act of researching as an open and ongoing process; not to find a 'solution' to a 'problem'<sup>24</sup> postulated by somebody else. Though this remark might appear as a refusal of the research's applicability, coherence and logic, I aim to clarify with the forthcoming work why my language is initially so indecisive.<sup>25</sup> I think this refusing style might actually provide space to see, describe and approach things (humans) in a different manner. Some

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it!

<sup>23</sup> Braidotti considers it a positive skill that she associates freely - and move swiftly - between scientific disciplines. (Braidotti, 2004). My experiences are more negative and therefore sceptic. In my opinion an academic Esperanto does not exist: there are many miscommunications. That gives space for very unscientific misuse of power. That does not mean that one should not try hard to get your arguments as descriptively and clearly out either. Lack of commensurable and even lack of comprehensible language might lead to misuse of power, in a nutshell to developments of which the critical imperative of the enlightenment project should activate us to be acting against. Under the guise of a 'cover of love' dialogue a lot of power struggles are concealed.

<sup>24</sup> For example the last decade populist tendency to 'say it as it is', in regard of immigrants, Islamic people or the EU in western countries.

persistent 'problems' might be handled practically and theoretically differently if it is approached in another manner. I apply a different approach as I want to do a critical and fundamental research. I use neologisms and new concepts<sup>26</sup> - Deleuze describes a concept as *'philosophical precisely because they create possibilities for thinking beyond what is already known or assumed.'* (Colebrook, 2002. P. 19) - in order to make very clear that I do not want to adhere to certain meanings. A relevant orientation to illustrate the forthcoming work is Deleuze' and Guattari's concept of multiplicity. *'A multiplicity is in the most basic sense a complex structure that does not reference a prior unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greater whole that have been fragmented, and they cannot be considered manifold expressions of a single concept or transcendent unity. On these grounds, Deleuze opposes the dyad One/Many, in all of its forms, with multiplicity. Further, he insists that the crucial point is to consider multiplicity in its substantive form - a multiplicity - rather than as an adjective - as multiplicity of something. Everything for Deleuze is a multiplicity in this fashion.'* (Roffe, J. 2010. P.181). Multiplicity can be elucidated in the metaphor of the rhizome; which is a mass of roots. Rhizomes are rampant, transversal and cross-linking strings which proliferate horizontally - taken after botany, underground - and connect in potentially infinite ways.<sup>27</sup> *'Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways.'*<sup>28</sup> (Deleuze & Guattari. 2004. P.14). *'In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierar-*

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<sup>25</sup> Mary Douglas hinted why I feel so uneasy, because I namely think I touch a taboo. *'Taboo protects the local consensus on how the world is organised. It shores up wavering certainty. It reduces intellectual and social disorder. We may well ask why is it necessary to protect the primary distinctions of the universe, and why are taboos so bizarre? The second theme answers this with reflections on the cognitive discomfort caused by ambiguity. Ambiguous things can seem very threatening. Taboo confronts the ambiguous and shunts it into the category of the sacred.'* (Douglas, M. 1966. xi). She continues that to *'be holy is to be whole, to be one: holiness is unity, integrity, perfection of the individual and of the kind.'* (Douglas, M. 1966. P. 67). I suddenly realised I am trying to open up a taboo by question [society]. Hence my style is initially so apologetic; exactly because I will question consensus about how the world is organised, I will be disorderly: question 'order'. Given some experiences I had with professors in my recent years, touching taboos can be threatening.

See as well Dale and Burrell: *'Emplacement implies control in space through fixing. It indicates a certain ordering or organisation: everything and everybody are put in their rightful places. Fixity is also associated with knowledge, with the achievement of a crucial 'grid of intelligibility' (...). It is a central part of many disciplines. Geography (maps), geometry (co-ordinates), architecture (buildings), anatomy (the fixing and straining of tissue sections), surveying (triangulation) and many more are all fundamentally based in the fixing of knowledge through their techniques of 'emplacement'.* (Dale, K. & B. Burrell. 2008. P.53).

<sup>26</sup> According to Deleuze the task of philosophy is to create concepts. A concept is according to him not an *'abstract idea representing the fundamental characteristics of what it represents.'* (concept according to wikipedia. Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept>, consulted on 29.03.2017). Therefore concepts *'are not labels or names that we attach to things; they produce an orientation or a direction for thinking'*. (Colebrook, C. 2002, P.15).

<sup>27</sup> Diverse in quality and infinite in quantity: *'always n- 1 dimensions.'* (Deleuze & Guattari. P. 7. 2004).

<sup>28</sup> I consider multiple here as infinite and random.

chical modes of communication and pre-established paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, non-signifying without a General<sup>29</sup> and without an organizing memory or central automation, defined solely by a circulation of states.’ (Deleuze & Guattari. P.23. 2004). Every point in such networks can connect with any possible other point. Connections can be broken at any point, without disconnecting the multiple fundamentally, because the rhizomatic network burrows as well into countless other connections. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). In other words, the most important feature of a rhizomatic network is the pluralism – the lack of a center – and the movement and variation. (Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks. 2001). There is a possibility of increase of dimensions of plurality, a multiplicity of connections, in which the character changes perpetually too. There are no fixed points and it is not susceptible for a structured or generative model. For example, according to Deleuze and Guattari trees- or root(model)s provide a *sad image* of a thinking that perpetually imitate the multiple by assuming a center or unity. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). Such thinking is considered by them as arborescent thinking, marked by dualism<sup>30</sup> and totalizing principles. In such models information is only connected from a higher unity to a successive element, through already existing channels of communication.

#### § 1.5.1 Literature review

This paragraph examines diverse literature related to neoliberal biopolitics and homelessness. Besides well-known philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Žižek we will, among others, consider Willse’s biopolitical take on homelessness. The consulted literature is an amalgam from various scientific fields, such as philosophy, sociology and social geography, political science, social work, law and health policy research. This indicates that biopolitics is currently relevant and therefore vividly applied in various fields. The kaleidoscopic character of this review is as well indicative of the difficulty to describe homelessness holistically; It appears that the respective scholars describe homelessness indirectly by posing a certain scientific, political or societal problem in relation to homelessness and through the connection of such a problem or practice an insight on homelessness is created. We will briefly consult the development of Michel Foucault’s coinage, notably his final lecture of the ‘Society must be defended’ lecture series in 1976, to subsequent contemporary

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<sup>29</sup> Such as objectivity.

<sup>30</sup> Among others Braidotti mentions that in dualistic oppositions - a tautology in itself – the one pole forms by definition the deviation of the, dominant, other. (2004).

applications of biopolitics. Neoliberalism as (bio-)political spectrum and what this means for contemporary western people shall be considered as well. Besides offering a brief overview of biopolitics as concept and a short overview of the state of the art of biopolitical studies this review will *inter alia* problematize some aspects of the literature which will respectively be applied to explain the relevance of this research. We will for example problematize the contextualization of homelessness hereafter. A relevant distinction between U.S.A.'s caring policies, or maybe more cynically put the lack thereof, and the by the author described Dutch policies will be made in paragraph 1.6. This difference will explain why this research is a relevant take on biopolitical practices compared to the studies from the U.S.'. The literature review will as well pave the way to the general issue researched in this work, namely the problematic application of the concept [society].

#### § 1.5.2 'foster life or disallow it to the point of death'

Foucault coined biopower as a modern developmental succession from disciplinary mechanisms applied by sovereign powers.<sup>31 32</sup> In the latter part of modernity a new system of political power has developed which Foucault coined biopolitical regulation; The health of the *bios*, the whole *socius*, man-as-species became the object of reference. The well-being and productivity as populations as whole became the objective for contemporary political systems. Economical, political and sociological problems are to be described in statistical terms.<sup>33</sup> (Foucault, M. 2003). Sociological monitoring became therefore a necessary tool for political power *'through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population.* (Foucault, M. 2003. P.139).

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<sup>31</sup> Disciplinary mechanisms were applied by sovereign powers whom had the *'right to take life or let live'* (Foucault, M. 2003. p.138). Such absolute rulers were so to say the representative of the most absolute ruler, god. Medieval monarchs ruled as sovereigns.

<sup>32</sup> Disciplinary mechanisms are still applied, though in a contemporary form, and that taken together with biopolitics Foucault calls 'biopower'.

<sup>33</sup> Typical biopolitical examples of studies to the productivity of society as whole is for example Jobe's remark that *'(o)ne of the central problems of the public health industry at least since the 1960s has been to address what the National Center for Health Statistics has called "the burden of death and illness experienced by low-income groups as compared with the nation as a whole."* (Jobe, K.S. 2010). Furthermore Jobe mentions *'that the regulation of homeless populations through these mechanisms of biopower constitute homeless populations as a biological threat to society at large, and that this begins to explain why population-based approaches to improving the health of homeless groups exacerbates rather than corrects health disparities between homeless groups and the rest of society.'* (Ibid.). Frohlich writes similarly issues between specific target groups and population level interventions. (Frohlich et al. 2008).

Another exemplary example of a contemporary form of biopolitics, where the assumption is held that problems can be 'tamed' is Phelan's remark that *'(h)omelessness damages the physical and mental health of those who are homeless and poses risks for the nonhomeless population by contributing to the spread of diseases such as tuberculosis and AIDS. Thus, it is of critical public health importance to understand what causes homelessness, how it can be prevented, and how episodes of homelessness can be shortened.'* (Phelan, J.C. & B.G. Link. 1999).

Agamben defines biopolitical life as *'the assimilation of natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of state power and politics'*. Power over life (F.N.: was) not exercised in this by a sovereign ruler; statistics are used as input for the actions of the government.' (Schuilenburg, 2008. P.1).

According to Foucault biopolitics meant that the pre- and early modern sovereign power was *'replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death'*. (Foucault, M. 2003. P.138). The *'letting die'* is by Foucault operationalised through the notion of racism, which he clarifies as the technique to establish hierarchies between different groups.<sup>34</sup> (Clough Marinaro, 2009). Foucault describes this as well as the *'killing'* by biopolitical powers, but immediately nuances his rather radical statement: *'When I (F.N.: Michel Foucault) say 'killing', I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on'*. (Foucault, M. P.256). Various scholars (Clough Marinaro, I. 2009, Beckett & Herbert, 2010, Boarder Giles, 2013, et al.) have considered Foucault's remark about biopolitics as the power to *'make live'* and *'let die'* (Foucault, M. 2003) paramount in their studies of contemporary homelessness. For example, Beckett & Herbert write that banishment is a *'punishment, meted out to those condemned as deviant or criminal. The practices that entail banishment rest on the assumption that the social problems to which they are frequently a response—homelessness, addiction, mental illness—may be understood and treated as criminal problems'*. (2010, p.11). According to Boarder Giles governmental policies are responsible for creating homelessness.<sup>35</sup><sup>36</sup> (Boarder Giles, 2013. P.123). Arnold mentions in a similar fashion that the *'forces that homeless people deal with are disenfranchisement and social "death": degrading myths and stereotypes, punitive treatment by caseworkers, deficient school systems that perpetuate illiteracy and joblessness'* (Arnold, K. 2004. P.13). *'There have been efforts to banish the homeless through antiloitering*

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<sup>34</sup>*'It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States. As a result, the modern State can scarcely function without becoming involved with racism at some point. (...) What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. (...) When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State'*. (Foucault, M. p. 254 & p. 256.)

<sup>35</sup> *'Homelessness, hunger, and survival itself are not only, in a sense, created by these policies'*. (Boarder Giles, 2013. P.123).

<sup>36</sup> Boarder Giles describes not solely the criminalization of homelessness but even the *criminalization of care* (italics by author) by writing about citizen groups supporting homeless people by organizing informal food distribution networks.

and vagrancy laws (abridges the right to freedom of movement), place homeless people in a double bind by arresting them for sleeping in public when they have nowhere else to go (cruel and unusual punishment) and to take away means of survival through seizure of property (violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendments).’ (Arnold, K. P.109). Beckett mentioned that the harsh restrictive and disciplining policies are a result of the incapability to deal more effectively with homeless people. (Beckett & Herbert, 2010).<sup>37</sup> I quote here extensively to indicate that the notion of the Foucault’s notion of the disallowance of life, not at least of citizens rights, are valid and relevant in regard of various U.S.’ anti-homelessness policies. For example, Craig Willse has written extensively about biopolitics and homelessness.<sup>38</sup> According to Willse homelessness is ‘*caused fundamentally by poverty and lack of affordable housing*’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.168). He blames neo-liberal arrangements for *reconfiguring* housing insecurity and considers that a productive force within neoliberalism. (Willse, C. 2010). Willse comments that initiatives to relief chronic homelessness do nothing to alter ‘*the structural conditions that produce housing insecurity and deprivation.*’<sup>39</sup> (Ibid.). He considers neoliberal social programmes for example as economic ventures with ends in themselves whom are profiting by not ending social problems.<sup>40</sup> (Willse, C. 2010). Though this statement could

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<sup>37</sup> Civil liberties are under pressure in a biopolitical system and the behavior of deviants, often people unproductive in an economic paradigm, are considered, probably increasingly, as criminal. Margier (2016) and Boarder Giles refer to a focus of policymakers from “‘the” public to whom they’re responsible (to) a market-public, and define public needs and priorities in ways that exclude homeless and economically marginalised people.’ (Boarder Giles, 2013. P. 28). ‘These policies need to be understood, too, on a larger scale. Like homelessness itself, they represent transformations in the fabric of urban living which have been both cause and effect throughout these vexed decades of political and economic (neo)-liberalisation.’ (Boarder Giles, 2013. P. 123).

<sup>38</sup> See: Universal Data Elements; ‘Or the Biopolitical life of Homeless Populations (2008), Neo-liberal Biopolitics and the Invention of Chronic Homelessness (2010), Beyond Biopolitics; Essays on the Governance of Life and Death (2011) & The Value of Homelessness; Managing Surplus Life In the United States. (2015).

<sup>39</sup> (I)nadequate “safety net” programs’ (...) force individuals to rely on emergency shelter systems. It does not go as far as advocating structural changes that might slow or end the reproduction of housing insecurity for example, challenging discriminatory renting practices.” (Willse, C. 2010. P.169).

<sup>40</sup> Willse applies on numerous occasions Foucault’s biopolitical notion of ‘fostering life and letting die; ‘Foucault argues that a form of racism allows for death in biopolitics, the death of some populations that are marked as inferior and harmful to the larger body of the nation.’ (Ticinetto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.50,51). ‘For Foucault, death, through state racism, makes life because it eliminates that which would sap the population of its strength and vitality; it is a cutting- out of loss and negation. But understanding death, the production of death and the management of death as economic activities suggests that that which is ill or dying does not need to be eliminated to grant biopolitical life to a population. The activity of dying, of being ill, offers economic life and productivity, as a matter to be neo-liberally and biopolitically managed. As the invention of chronic homelessness makes clear, welfare policy and administration, viewed as technologies of biopower operating within economic contexts, may invest in life and health as objects of governance without challenging the conditions that reproduce and distribute illness and exposure to premature death. In the neo- liberal context, economic activity and biopolitical death grow side by side.’ (Willse, C. 2010. P.180).

I find the idea of biopolitics as ‘letting die’, or even to disinvest in life not relevant for my research, as my problem is more the nagging persistence to be included in a regime of care in order to be (part of society), instead of

be further scrutinized in itself, in The Netherlands for-profit social programmes working with homeless people are non-existent.<sup>41</sup> In Willse's studies structuralistic descriptions prevail, such as economic, political and social structures, whereas individual agency ('life skills') related problems are underexposed:<sup>42</sup> Willse implies even that there would not be homelessness without the structural biopolitical racism, and that homeless people are able to self-manage their life without the neo-liberal neglect and disinvestment. (Ibid.). Willse states that '*at a discursive level chronic homelessness evokes addiction and hence individual behaviour and personal attributes.*' (2010. P.171). I am more inclined to consider homelessness as a multifaceted, and mostly very complex problem. As such there is no clear and uniform direction for any responsibility to be addressed.

### § 1.5.3 a nuance which describes a problem as more complex

After Foucault's elaboration of racism where he describes the homi- and suicidal tendencies of Nazi Germany, Foucault nuanced himself that such extreme biopolitical tendencies do 'perhaps (not apply) in all states'.<sup>43</sup> (Foucault, M. 2003. P.261). At least in the described policies in regard of homelessness in The Netherlands the problem is not about people whom are let to die: The biopolitical (and hence practical) problem in northern European (rudimentary-)welfare states is about how to 'include' the 'marginal'. This aim to 'include' could serve as a totalizing power to the point there may and can not exist any 'rogues', 'misfits' or 'misplaced' people if we bare in mind that in order to have biopolitical power there should be control over whole populations.<sup>44</sup> (Foucault, 2003). We have witnessed in the former paragraph (§1.5.2) that there has been an excess of, mostly U.S.' descriptions which support a Foucaultian biopolitical neglect of (citizen) life to the point of

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neglect. As well Willse is paying considerable attention to race, in the sense of skincolour, relations, and he implies housing deprivation is a racist tool to disadvantage black communities. I will not deny racism in The Netherlands, but the housing market is not that racially segregated as for example in the U.S.A.

<sup>41</sup> I mention this explicitly because I think it depends on a local context what kind of policies are applied (or lacking). I reckon hence that a description of more grim U.S. environments are not that illustrative for northern European practices. However, I would like to stress again that the U.S. environments are rather different than Rhinelandic or Scandinavian social policies.

<sup>42</sup> Bhugra mentioned we ought to resist a single explanation for homelessness; I underwrite that command.

On page 32, I will refer to the substance abuse often associated with homeless people. However, if we postpone Willse's conviction that people are homeless because of structural conditions, we might as well consider that because of substance abuse people might have lost their dwelling. In other words, such an invariable stance denies a certain chicken-or-egg problem. I am sceptical to make a hard choice between structure or agency approach, but I find Willse's sided and unbalanced description of homelessness rather naive and as well prejudiced. It leaves an impression Willse aims to prove that the U.S. policies battling homeless reveal a certain structural political unwillingness, as if the people are made homeless by default. This leaves an impression that Willse's political agenda prevails in his writing, or at least causes a particular radical bias.



death. There is as well literature, usually not coined as biopolitical though, which claims not all social policies to relief homeless are *'uniformly hostile (...), and argue that some of them are in fact supportive of homeless people. (Some cities have taken) a positive approach to reducing homelessness by providing appropriate housing and support as an alternative to life on the streets'* (...). This demonstrates how urban homeless policy is *"rarely entirely – or even wholly – punitive."* (Margier, A. P.64. 2016). Instead of letting somebody perish to death, the problem seems, at least to me, considering my past workexperience in a Dutch homelessshelter, not so much how to turn problematic lifes of homeless, drunkards, addicts, mentally ill and petty criminals into productice life, but how to deal with the stress of about on the hand the impossibility to control - to have power over deviants<sup>45</sup> - and on the other hand the civilian and (bio-)political taboo to let people perish (to death). The local Dutch practice in §1.6 and §1.7 will be considered as a biopolitical problem, but not as a problem of abandonment (which extreme is disinvestment to the point of death).

#### § 1.5.4 neoliberal biopolitics; what it means on a personal level

The contemporary western political system is neoliberal post-political biopolitics. (Žižek, 2008). It is the time where biopolitics became dominant. (Willse, 2008). In the second part of this paragraph I will connect neoliberal post-political disciplining of individuals.

Neoliberalism enhances a paradoxical form of governmentality<sup>46</sup>; it namely appears to govern without governing.<sup>47</sup> *'Neoliberalism is (...) the paradigm of governmental reason: it is a way of understanding political rule and the regulation of the general conduct of individuals in a manner*

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<sup>43</sup> We will not state that Foucault's take on racism is false or outdated universally, think for example of Achille Mbembe (2003) insights on necropolitics or the dire situations of illegal immigrants and their perpetual non-citizenship status, or people perishing away in the numerous violent conflicts in the world.

<sup>44</sup> See as well footnote 7 on Finlands 'house first' policy.

<sup>45</sup> Another reason for disagreement between the author and Willse is the latter's statement that for *'municipalities, chronic homelessness programmes became a way of containing an unruly social problem that has not been made to disappear by decades of social and political abandonment.'* (Willse, C. 2010. P.174). In my experiences as worker in a shelter for homeless people, we, the workers at the shelter, had virtually no power to actually 'tame' unruly people. At least the shelter where I have worked had very little power over the peoples behavior and whereabouts.

<sup>46</sup> Governmentality refers to *'the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, and to the creation of an analytical grid for assessing the efficacy of this conduct.'* (Foucault, 2008. P.186).

<sup>47</sup> Foucault considers neoliberalism *'as a specific art of governing human beings.'* (Lemke, 2011. P.45). *'The new art of government (...) appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: 'be free', with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain. Neoliberalism operates on interests, desires, and aspirations; (...) it acts on the conditions of actions. This trajectory follows a fundamental paradox; as power becomes less restrictive, less corporeal, it also becomes more intense, saturating the field of actions.'* (Read, 2009. P.29).

whereby everything would be controlled to the point of self-sustenance, without the need for intervention.' (McNay, 2009. P.57). Foucault describes neoliberal governmental concern to intervene in all layers of [societies].<sup>48</sup> (Foucault, 2013). It is relevant to consider that neoliberalism is not a laissez-faire style of government as there are perpetually interventions and policies implemented to enhance neoliberalism.<sup>49</sup> (Ibid.). Foucault mentioned *'that from the sociological point of view (neoliberalism) is just a way of establishing strictly market relations in society.'* (Foucault, M. 2008. P.130). The *homo oeconomicus* is the designated outcome of neoliberal post-political biopolitics. The *homo oeconomicus* is described by Foucault as an individual whom is entrepreneurial and hence productive.<sup>50</sup> (Foucault, 2004). *"(T)he kind of network of intelligibility of his behavior is economic behavior. ...[T]he individual becomes governmentalizable, that power gets a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a homo oeconomicus."* (Foucault, M. 2008. P. 252). A relevant development regarding homeless people is that there are ample institutions to support these people to become *homo oeconomici*; productive (that means, self-sufficient) 'members of [society]'. Slogans such as 'learn to participate' are commonly applied in the neoliberal Netherlands: there are for example organizations working to empower *informal care networks*.<sup>51</sup> Though contemporary popular conceptions often have it people were being cared for in the welfare state of the 1970s and 1980s, which might be disputed by the way<sup>52</sup> (Schinkel 2008), since the 1990s increasingly the focus to be(-come) productive as individual has come to the fore. In the next chapter I will question from an ethical and pragmatic point of view if one ought to ask people

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<sup>48</sup> Foucault mentions that *'technical, scientific, juridical and demographic, in general social, factors to be the object of governmental intervention.'* (Foucault, M. P.190. 2013).

<sup>49</sup> *'Neoliberal governmental interventions are thus not less intense, less frequent, less active and less a continuity than in any other (political or economic) system.'* (Foucault, M. 2013. P.145 & Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011).

<sup>50</sup> Individuals had to become entrepreneurial because the welfare states have been dismantled, or to use a more contemporary term; 'deregulated'. (Lemke, 2011). Foucault describes this development poignantly: *'So, what does this sociological government want to do in relation to this society that has now become the object of governmental intervention and practice? It wants, of course, to make the market possible. (...) This means that what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity- effect, but a society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket society, but an enterprise society. The homo œconomicus sought after is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production.'* (Foucault, M. 2008. P.146, 147). *'Homo œconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is true to the extent that, in practice, the stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo œconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo œconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.'* (Foucault, M. 2008. P. 226).

<sup>51</sup> See for example the webpage of the 'Inclusion lab': <http://www.inclusionlab.nl/?p=168>.

<sup>52</sup> We will not participate in that discussion here though.

to be entrepreneurial if they lack such skills.

Foucault's timely analysis foresaw individualising<sup>53</sup> (self-)control (1977). The internalization of that would develop into a different, advanced sort of technique, namely *"(f)ree-floating control that replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system."*<sup>54</sup> (Deleuze, 1992. P.5). A 'society of control' is an open environment where every position of any element is known and where control leads to modulation.<sup>55</sup> (Deleuze, 1992). Think for example of various smart-phone apps which record work productivity, diet, sleep, and physical health and exercise; The commonness of such apps demonstrate the normality of productivity and physical self-discipline. The usage of self-surveillance technology is being rewarded; service goes faster (for example on an airport in case you check in yourself) or one gets discounts using a loyalty program or customer card. (Schneier, B. 2015). It is more productive to reward than to punish. *'This abstract space of capitalism produces a form of social-spatial politics which hides its own operations of power under a cloak of transparency, visibility and openness.'* (Dale, K. & B. Burrell. 2008. P.16). The body became only useful when it is productive and subjective. In order to be productive - think again for example of the public transport chipcard - and to move swiftly between places one is subjugated to a historically speaking unparalleled and sophisticated total surveillance system. The contemporary digital environments, think of platforms such as facebook, linked-in and the spectrum of google-products, which are indispensable in contemporary life to 'maintain' a social network are essentially data collection techniques where you receive a free service in return for your information. (Schneier, B. 2015). These technologies are characterized by their elegance. (Foucault, M. 1985). Contemporary styles of governance are sophisticated and subtle, but can nevertheless be physical, think of the public transport chipcard for example. Deleuze mentioned the 'societies of control' are a recent invention and that is possible humanity will experience a revival of earlier notions of government,

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<sup>53</sup> Individualization, 'discovered' in disciplinary regimes are an essential part of biopolitical governance.

<sup>54</sup> *'Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws.'* (Deleuze, 1992. P.3).

*'These mechanisms do not tend to a nullification of phenomena in the form of the prohibition, "you will not do this," nor even, "this will not happen," but in the form of a progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by the phenomena themselves. In a way, they involve the delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than the imposition of a law that says no to them. So mechanisms of security are not put to work on the sovereign-subjects axis or in the form of the prohibition.'* (Foucault, M. 1977. P.93).

<sup>55</sup> *'(W)hat counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person's position - licit or illicit - and effects a universal modulation.'* (Deleuze, 1992. P.6).

for example the techniques of discipline or the application of a sovereign. (Deleuze, 1992). In case the implicit command to be an entrepreneur of ones life project does not lead to a productive life, Foucaults earlier researched disciplinary and even punishing techniques are still applicable (Willse, G. 2008): like the homeless visitors of the shelter someone can still become an object in prohibiting medical, penal and scientific regimes.<sup>56</sup> Biopower has *'two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. (...) Individuals have become 'dividuals' and masses, samples, data, markets, or banks.'* (Deleuze, 1992. P.5).

Žižek considers neoliberalism as *post-political biopolitics*. (2008). It appears initially odd how a political system can be post-political; how could a political system have ceased to be political? Post- implies that the former ideologies are passé. According to Schinkel there is a lacunae of real politics in post-political biopolitics: contemporary political debates lack *real* different point of views and *real* political ideas; what is left is management - governance without ideology.<sup>58</sup> (Schinkel, 2008). The biopolitical means the regulation of safety and wellbeing of people as primary goal of [society]. In case you do not have any ideology other than well-being - case there lacks

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<sup>56</sup> *'Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed.'* (Foucault, M. 1978. p.139). Bigo coined the term banopticon 'to describe a situation where profiling technologies are used to determine who to place under surveillance.' (Fierke, 2007. P.183).

<sup>57</sup> See for example: 'To capture the sense of a field of data as I describe requires looking to what Foucault called the other pole of biopower, biopolitics. Disciplinary management, including the psychodynamic model of case management in social work, describes those techniques of power organized through disciplinary enclosures and directed at the human subject, the body and soul of that subject, and its relationship to other subjects in space. Biopolitics, on the other hand, seeks to regulate the social or collective processes of life, death and productivity across a population (Foucault, 1978:139; See also Foucault, 2003:239-264). Together, discipline and biopolitics function to bring biological objects and processes into political and economic calculation; discipline does so by addressing the animal body of individualized man whereas biopolitics does so by addressing the species body of the total population.' (Willse, G. 2008. P. 243).

<sup>58</sup> Žižek writes that *"the post-political" is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus on expert management and (social) administration, while 'biopolitics' designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal. It is clear how these two dimensions overlap: once one renounces big ideological causes, what remains is only the efficient administration of life.* (Žižek, 2008. P.41).

positive ideology<sup>59</sup> and meaning became a private matter - in a political system, fear will be only and solely mobilising element in our political systems.<sup>60</sup> For example fear for maladjustment in regard of religion, race or social class. *'As a result, notions of subjectivity shift, where being a subject is recognized only in terms of being a "good" citizen and the punishment of those who are not considered good citizens: all forms of life that are not "organized on the basis of market values" then become "characterized as a potential security risk"'* (Povinelli, 2009. P.22). Our [societies] have developed into what Schinkel has described as *'social hypochondric societies'*; our [societies] are obsessively focusing on potential, but imagined, illnesses in the 'societal body'. (Schinkel, 2008). Instead of repression of criminal and illicit behavior after an illicit act, nowadays there is a tendency developing towards 'prepression' - a combination of prevention and repression; before a possible wrongdoing can be committed, it will be already prevented or sanctioned. (Schinkel, 2012). Whom is obsessed with safety is perpetually busy to chart risks in order to restrict those. The attention shifts from a focus after an event to *before* something happens.<sup>61</sup> The to be disputed idea that all misery can be banned leads to further interventions in the private and legal spheres of people. Secondly, in case one is not an *homo oeconomicus* one will become an object in an expert regime in which one is either (re-)educated, trained, disciplined or in the last resort punished: One ought to [re-integrate] by doing work, education, rehabilitation therapy or confinement. Foucault begged for an awareness for miscegenation between health care and the legal sectors.

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<sup>59</sup> There is not much what can 'unite' in contemporary [societies], but there is consensus about what is terrible. To think in an utopian way is out of fashion, to think dystopian is in vogue. (Schinkel, 2005).

<sup>60</sup> Since contemporary spheres are depoliticized, the only way people can nowadays become enthusiastic for the professional coordination and management seems to be the a-political realm of fear. Fear constitutes as core-concept of the contemporary subjectivity. That is why biopolitics is politics of fear; she is just there to protect the general well-being according to Žižek. (Žižek, S. 2009). Žižek continues: *'what remains is only the efficient administration of life. ... almost only that. That is to say, with the depoliticised, socially objective, expert administration and coordination of interests as the zero level of politics, the only way to introduce passion into this field, to actively mobilise people, is through fear, a basic constituent of today's subjectivity.'* (Žižek, 2008. P.41). Žižek elaborates further on the aspect of fear as: *'biopolitics is ultimately a politics of fear, it focuses on defence from potential victimisation or harassment. This is what separates a radical emancipatory politics from our political status quo. We're talking here (...) about the difference between politics based on a set of universal axioms and a politics which renounces the very constitutive dimension of the political, since it resorts to fear as its ultimate mobilising principle: fear of immigrants, fear of crime, fear of godless sexual depravity, fear of the excessive state itself, with its burden of high taxation, fear of ecological catastrophe, fear of harassment. Political correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the politics of fear. Such a (post-)politics always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid ochlos or multitude: it is the frightening rallying of frightened people.'* (Žižek, 2008. P.42).

<sup>61</sup> For example the Netherlands police is piloting a so called 'Crime Anticipation System' based on 'big data'. Source: <http://nltimes.nl/2017/05/15/dutch-police-use-big-data-predict-crime-manage-resources>, consulted 18.05.2017.

(1989).<sup>62</sup> *'(A)n extralegal administrative discourse has turned the legitimacy of governance over to technical systems of compliance and efficiency that underwrite the relationship of the state and the economy with a biopolitics of (...) and surveillance.'* (Ticinato Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.1). A certain freedom, for example to deviate from certain norms regarding productivity, physical and mental health, and a certain deviation from acceptable norms regarding religious or political beliefs or physical presence in some physical and online spaces are restricted in postpolitical neoliberalism. According to Schinkel democracies should reconcile with the fact that terrible events can and will occur. (Schinkel, 2012). And likewise that some people, in fact a small minority, are deviant. That is the idea of freedom: freedom means that people deviate from norms. (Ibid). To tackle risk there is an increasing call for surveillance. Hence people are increasingly monitored and influenced. Dillon and Reid consider that the *"reduction of the human to the biohuman"* implies that *'the subject of rights is reduced to the object of regulatory rule'*, in other words to *'information and code'*." (Chandler, 2010. P.89,91). Through technological development ubiquitous surveillance is cheap and possible, but humanity is facing a paradoxical situation of an information-overload: how to filter the exponentially increasing amount of data meaning- and carefully?<sup>63</sup> (Schneier, B. 2015).

We assume a comprehensive biopolitical study only works if considered how individuals and systems are producing each other. In fact, I should consider that [society] and individual are not separate identities: Namely can you be an 'dividual' if not part of [society]?<sup>64</sup> (Deleuze, 1992). I

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<sup>62</sup> Foucault writes that every *'crime or every offense bears the possibility of insanity. The law does not solely judge; she implies a conception of normativity and a technical prescription for possible normalisation. (...) During the criminal trial and the penitential implementation appurtenant institutions are abound. About the main verdict of a judge manifold smaller juridical authorities and parallel functioning judges: specialist psychologist and psychiatrist, civil servants, (...) educators, penitentiary officials. They cut into bits the legal power to punish, they are assistant judges.'* (Foucault, M. 1989. P.34). Arnold mentions as well that *'(d)elinquency, anomalies, deviations, potential dangers, illness, and this form of existence must be accounted for in formulating policy and prescription. The entire extrajudicial web supports the functioning of the norm and the body of knowledge generated on this basis evidences the denaturing of the power that authorities exercise. The rules and laws set up around assessing each client or case function as a normative power. Discipline hierarchizes, individualizes, and categorizes. It subscribes to a binary mode (good/bad, deserving/undeserving) and the contemporary version of branding (through documentation, the transformation of each individual into a case, and fingerprinting, for example). Knowledge is generated from the combination of this power that infiltrates society and penalty on all levels and involves the individual as a subject to be investigated, the effectiveness of the power wielded, and the social or human sciences that support disciplinary power.'* (Arnold, K. 2004. P.107).

<sup>63</sup> In paragraph 2.3 I will illustrate this problem using an allegory of Kafkas story of the Chinese wall.

<sup>64</sup> See as well Foucault: *'Let's now take discipline. I think it is indisputable, or hardly disputable, that discipline normalizes. Again we must be clear about the specificity of disciplinary normalization. (...) Discipline (...) analyzes and*

will elaborate on this in insight in the next chapter applying Derrida's 'Rogues'.

#### § 1.5.5 the complexity of contextualizing

This subparagraph will explain more about homelessness from various angles: a historical study covering the last century of homelessness in the United States (DePastino, 2003), a book on personal experiences and motivation for 'on the ground' social work to relieve homeless people (Steele, 2012) and lastly a study which focuses particularly on the interconnectedness between homelessness and mental health. (Bhugra, 2007). The reviewed books made clear there is a persistent problem in regard of the description of homelessness, namely how to localize or spatialize it?

DePastino mentions for example in the introduction of his historical study on hobos in the United States that the *'first step of such an investigation is (...) plotting the boundaries (...) and analyzing the politics of a way of life largely forgotten by historians and obscured by contemporary assumptions and concerns.'* (DePastino. 2003. xx). I find DePastino's expression 'plotting the boundaries' particularly puzzling because hobos are seemingly fluid and elusive, so why the stress - or the possibility - to *'plot the boundaries'*, and how to do so? (Ibid.). DePastino mentions that *'hobos almost always defined their world in terms not only of class, but also of race, ethnicity, gender, and region.'* (Ibid.) DePastino refers throughout his book to the concern to describe hobos more nuanced and diverse than just as an exponent of a class struggle or as a concern of white heterosexual males only, but besides that intention DePastino does not consider or refers to methodological issues - 'how to plot the boundaries' - in his further insightful historical study on hoboism. (2003). Danielle Steele's *'A gift of hope: Helping the homeless'* is - possibly non unintentionally<sup>65</sup> - mostly a book about the personal experiences of the author as volunteer social worker. It is written in a motivational style and the author is blending religious beliefs and ditto motivations throughout the book. Steele's personal experiences explain why for some people it is rather difficult to have a pro-

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*breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and operations. It breaks them down into components such that they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other. It is this famous disciplinary, analytical-practical grid that tries to establish the minimal elements of perception and the elements sufficient for modification. Second, discipline classifies the components thus identified according to definite objectives.'* (Foucault, M. 1977. P.84).

<sup>65</sup> A common characteristic of the field of social work is described by Steel; namely that the homeless people eventually stay alien to a social worker. Steel describes how hard it is to build a relation of trust with the people living on the streets, a prerequisite in order to get to know the homeless people well. To my opinion the fallacy of the book is that instead of writing about the difficulties to describe homeless people Steele covers the lacuna by writing more about herself - her personal motivations and religious beliefs - than about the initial topic of the book.



ductive<sup>66</sup> lifestyle. I admire Steele's activism and her description of a destitution of imagination and lack of practical common sense in some social policies, for example when municipalities are treating symptoms instead of causes: Steele dislikes policies to expel homeless people from municipalities by forcing them with a one way ticket out of an area.<sup>67 68</sup> As well she describes lively the difficult bureaucratic processes homeless people are facing.<sup>69</sup> (Steele, 2012). What I consider most relevant to enunciate for the forthcoming research is that Steele seems undetermined regarding her description on [society]: on the one hand she does not assume that [societies] are a coherent or perfect (domain). However elsewhere in her book Steele claims that most *'of the homeless are there because they cannot function in our society'*. (Steele, 2012. P. 109). I want to stress it is likewise possible to describe that *'our [society]'* cannot function either with the homeless ((or with other 'problematic' people, like (illegal) immigrants)). And whose, or which [society] is it anyways? The problem is: [society] cannot observe itself in a neutral fashion. (Schinkel, 2007). Steele applies

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<sup>66</sup> Obviously 'productive' is a very normalizing term: with that I mean a lifestyle in which one can earn an income and take care of oneself, and ideally as well perform caring tasks to family and others.

<sup>67</sup> *"Informed sources say that one of New York's best tools to deal with the homeless are bus tickets to New Jersey. Likewise, at one time San Francisco had a program to give them bus tickets to anywhere but here. Just get them out! It's a modern-day version of the pea-under-the-shell game. Just move it around to somewhere else, and hide it there.* (Steele, 2012. P. 93).

<sup>68</sup> A similar expulsion policy has been applied in Utrecht during my worktime in the homeless' shelter. *'Since the start of the project the disruption of public order caused by the homeless Middle and Eastern Europeans significantly decreased. Barka helps to encourage them to look for jobs or to go back to the country of origin.'* Source: <http://www.barkauk.org/news/volkskrant-polish-organization-helps-homeless-in-utrecht/>, consulted on 04.05.2017. Though the positive tone of the newspaper article, as far as I am aware nobody has researched the long-term feasibility of this expulsion with one way bustickets to Poland. The experiences of the people working at the shelter are that many 'exported' Polish men were within a week back to the city they were expelled from. Only the 'export' of the homeless people went into the municipal statistics though. Willse writes that '(f)or agencies, making their numbers "get better"—not necessarily their clients—will draw in more money.' (Willse, G. 2008. P. 246).

<sup>69</sup> *"Civic leaders in every city find homeless people lingering on the streets and in doorways an embarrassment. They want them to go away. Merchants complain that the homeless interfere with business. And there are programs in every city designed to assist them to get off the streets, or so they say. But in truth only the most functional among the homeless are able to access those programs. Lines are endless, forms are impossible to decipher, qualifications can't be met, standards don't apply. Waiting lists for every kind of facility keep people on hold for months for medical care, detox programs, housing. Some waits are as long as a year, while those on the lists grow despondent, get sicker and more desperate, or die. Funding is being slashed and eliminated at and "helps them. Those were the people we looked for when we did outreach on the streets: the ones who couldn't get to free dining rooms, and the many who were often justifiably afraid of shelters, or too disturbed to be allowed to enter them, and had no idea how to fill out forms to access help. They are the truly forgotten people of the streets, and the ones in greatest need. If we don't reach out to them, who will? Almost no one does. (...)*

*I don't know about you, but going to the DMV gives me the vapors, standing in line at a department store makes me hysterical, and looking at a six-page form of any kind makes me feel brain dead. How is someone who is already in dire straits and often disoriented supposed to access help in a system where even trying to reach someone by phone puts you in cyberhell? Today calling a doctor, an insurance company, the post office, a passport agency, an airline, or even local information is a nightmare. How are people who are already in shaky shape supposed to deal with that? They don't. They just give up. [...]"* (Steele, 2012. P. 93, 94).

[society] in a gliding scale or at least loosely, sometimes as something one should want to be part of but as well as an intolerant excluding mechanism and sometimes as the sum of all people and all their problems in a certain geographical place. I point this inconsistency out in Steele's book but I have noticed the volatile use of the word rather frequently throughout my research, even by social scientists. Maybe because of the volatility of [society] it is so often applied in contemporary political discourses? The volatility of the oft-applied word is a motivation for my research.

Dinesh Bhugra's *'Homelessness and Mental Health'* (2007) describes the difficulty how to organize appropriate care for homeless people because of the multiple problems homeless people and relating institutions are facing. *'The homeless have complex and interrelated needs including food, housing, help for physical and psychological health problems and for substance misuse'* (Bhugra, 2007. p.100). *'Homelessness and Mental health'* has ample attention for the complexity<sup>70</sup> of homelessness, mental health care, criminal law and the penal system and social geographic changes, for example gentrification, in cities. Throughout the book the description of homelessness is discussed and problematized, for example the difficulty to apply a holistic definition and the difficulty to classify homeless.<sup>71</sup> What I find particularly outstanding in relation to the forthcoming study is that - regardless that Bhugra takes into account the difficulty to describe complex matter, graphs, matrixes and 'objectifying' knowledge<sup>72</sup> are nevertheless applied. In other words, on the one hand Bhugra seems to request mildness to acknowledge a certain methodological elusiveness but on the other hand the researchers continues after the initial methodologic dubiousness in a modern and contemporary 'evidence-based' fashion. How is it methodologically possible to reconcile these apparent differences in style between modern and critical science? Why admit there should be a methodological or epistemological modesty but nevertheless proceed with such

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<sup>70</sup> 'Complexus is that what is composed, a collage of various elements which appear inseparable. Complexity is the tissue of events and actions, interactions, counteractions, provisions and chances which form our observable world. In other words 'complexitythinking' includes an investigative attitude how order, certainty and security are constructed, how ambiguity is expelled, how things are clarified, distinguished and hierarchized. By interventions necessary for reasonability and comprehensibility the risk occurs that some aspects of the complexus are reduced or dispelled, what could cause, metaphorically put, near-sighted or even blindness. Complexity thinking aims to include considerations and politics in regard of reduction.' (Morin, 2008 in Nieuwenhuizen, 2015).

<sup>71</sup> '(D)efinitions of homelessness vary as do housing conditions (...), which makes direct comparisons on the level of homelessness difficult. The relationship of poor housing, available housing at affordable costs, unemployment and increasing rates of repossession due to economic factors on the one hand and on the other hand mental illness resulting from all these factors and often leading to loss of 'home' turns into a vicious spiral. (Bhugra, 2007. P.3).

<sup>72</sup> For various reasons, critically but as well pragmatically, I will refrain from doing a research with aims for 'objective' knowledge.

knowledge production? May I reduce complexity just to the graphic descriptions as applied in Bhugra's book? Or is a fact- and method based modern, with which I mean an empiristic, positivistic and application oriented approach to be problematized?<sup>73</sup> (Evans, B. 2015) *'Homelessness and Mental Health'* does not engage with a critical research into its own method.

The problem to spatialize the complex homelessness in [societies] is distinctively mentioned by DePastino Steele and Bhugra.<sup>74</sup> The authors recognize the complexity and difficulty to describe homelessness, but after initial observations of this problem the authors continue nevertheless with their story or research: These studies lack a critical philosophical perspective.

Initially I intended to describe in the literature review 'the' context of this research, as that virtue is commonplace in an inquiry. But before long it became clear it is very difficult to describe a context without affirming it as a descriptive or even as prescriptive. I ought to research if there actually exist a common place, in other words context, before anything else, like a common that surround something, a space 'in which something occurs' (as environment or setting) which can clarify the functioning of [society].<sup>75</sup> If I do not question [society] in which homelessness apparently by default occurs the risk exists I accept [it] as rigid discourse of which I cannot deviate after its performative confirmation.<sup>76</sup> In other words; the spaces in which homelessness occurs will be problematized and therefore the application of the common descriptive word has to be terminated. I do not deny the social though, but I consider it as de facto as various and multiple spheres. Arnold states that if biopolitical cases are described, usually the focus is on 'problemcases', such as homeless people, and that academics and policymakers are usually not investigated in these casuistry; *'(T)he politics of homelessness is a larger problem that reflects upon our society and the status of democracy rather than being a mere policy issue.'* (Arnold, K. 2004. P.13). There are practical con-

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<sup>73</sup> 'This is a discourse that enshrines data, correlations, and performance, while eschewing matters of substance, social problems, and power.' (Evans, B. 2015).

<sup>74</sup> Bhugra's insights on homelessness and mental health will be mentioned on page 21 which deals particularly with this issue.

<sup>75</sup> Context means '1. The parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its meaning, or 2. The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs: environment, setting.' Source: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/context>, consulted on 08.05.2017.

<sup>76</sup> The consulted applied literature in this paragraph, namely the texts of Phelan & Link (1999), Clough Marinaro (2009), Beckett & Herbert (2010), Sorenson (2013), Hennigan (2013) and Boarder Giles (2013) all mention [society] as an uncritically and as uncontested concept, and as such confirm a certain biopolitical frame of prevailing a body-as-whole.

cerns, for example mentioned stigmatization<sup>77</sup> which works counterproductive in a biopolitical sense.

#### § 1.6 about inept contemporary survival skills & criminalization of homelessness<sup>78</sup>

During my master studies in The Netherlands I have been working in a shelter<sup>79</sup> for homeless<sup>80</sup> people near the medieval Dom tower in the city center of Utrecht. This shelter is a dayshelter; the people visiting the place sleep either outdoors or at various nightshelters. As well people whom 'have a roof above their head'<sup>81</sup> spend time in the 'livingroom' as it is dubbed as most homeless people lack a social network outside of the fellow homeless people and sometimes some befriended caretakers. The origins of the shelter lay in pastoral streetwork - the organization has a protestant denomination - and as well receives part of its funding through religious charities. In it's day to day practice there is not a missionary agenda though, but because of it's religious denomination this organization has a certain independence to various governmental bodies, such as the municipality and the municipal health care. This is relevant, because 'neutral' scientific based modern organizations, such as municipal healthcare. A caring organization with a religious denomination has some agility to leverage biopolitical tendencies, and counter these with a religious - ethical agenda. As well, the shelter where I worked was just what it is, namely a shelter: A place to 'hide' so to say. This organization main focus, although not against it either and willing to provide longer term and structural support, was for the visitors there to provide a breathing space. Arnold mentions that many *'shelters and agencies go beyond simple admonitions, however, and issue ultimatums. Some are contradictory and put the homeless in a double bind. Indeed, the system that helps them can often be erratic, disorganized, and pathological. Of course, these terms are often reserved for the homeless, not "us."'* (Arnold, K.R. 2004. P.2). Such a tendency where a caring

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<sup>77</sup> 'Banishment is also counterproductive because it imperils efforts by the socially marginal to integrate with mainstream society.' (Beckett & Herbert. 2010, p.17).

<sup>78</sup> This chapter has been written before studying key texts from Foucault about biopolitics, but that the theoretical naïvety illustrates biopolitical tendencies from practice based experience.

<sup>79</sup> The shelter is called the 'Catharijnehuis', which translates as Catherine's house or Catherine's place. It's webpage is: <http://www.catharijnehuis.nl/>, consulted on 30.03.2017.

<sup>80</sup> Bhugra mentions there is no clear cut definition of homelessness: *'It emerges that there remains no single consensual definition of homelessness and that any definition will lie somewhere on a spectrum between 'not deliberately roofless' to 'all roofless and all those resident in bad housing'. It is important to bear this debate in mind while assessing any models of homelessness.'* (Bhugra, D. 2007. P.27).

<sup>81</sup> Often only for a short time though, because many people visiting the shelter are unable to pay their bills or they cause disturbance in their new street.

organization 'shoots itself in their foot' by being idealistic and soft, and on the other hand get disentangled in a biopolitical surveillance regime. That might explain why many homeless get disillusioned with for example mental-, health- and financial care.

The shelter is frequented by people of a diverse background; people born in Utrecht and as well other 'native' Dutch people, by people from other parts of Europe, for example by relatively many Polish men and moreover by people from other parts of the world, for example by people from north- and sub-Sahara Africa. Illegal immigrants - people without the right to be in the European Union - are among the people visiting the shelter. Most of the homeless visitors<sup>82</sup> are men, but there are female visitors too. Some homeless visitors are almost under aged whereas others elder-ly.<sup>83</sup> The visitors are usually people without a space many people consider home; a place of which one has a front door key where you can relax and have privacy. The visitors are in general people without jobs or any other legal income, although some sell the local 'big issue'. (Moll, 2005). The majority of them do not receive any dole.<sup>84</sup> Many of the visitors have been in jail. Some of them are 'on the run' to avoid being detained (again) to jail or immigration detention. For most of the visitors it seems difficult to maintain meaningful relations with family members or with non-homeless acquaintances and friends, and hence lack a stable social network.<sup>85</sup> Welfare safety nets have been dismantled in the ongoing process of neoliberalization. In a nutshell; visitors usually face multidimensional struggles in their life and their homelessness is usually persistent. (Mol, 2005). The causes of the persistency of the homelessness seem to be on the one hand that the visitors are so to say inept in life skills.<sup>86</sup> Tasks and skills which are normal, easy and self-

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<sup>82</sup> At Catherine's house it is common to describe the people visiting the place as visitor, and not as homeless.

<sup>83</sup> During my time at the shelter one homeless visitor was in fact on the run from a retirement home because he did not like the treatment he received there.

<sup>84</sup> Although some homeless visitors have the right for financial support, but because of problems with welfare institutions can not receive it.

<sup>85</sup> Anno 2017 many people might consider 'social network' to be their social media network but I consider social network in the sociological sense.

<sup>86</sup> I consider life skills as '*adaptive and positive behaviour that enable humans to deal effectively with the demands and challenges of everyday life.*' Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life\\_skills](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_skills), consulted 05.03.2017.

Although this is not a research into the agency related causes of homelessness, I consider a combination of lack of formal education, a lack of positive and caring upbringing, poor languageskills and illiteracy, illegality, a criminal record and the combination of mental problems and substance abuse, and moreover the combination of such factors are reasons why some people have poor lifeskills. This enumeration is just a fraction of possible frustrations in life, but among other things daily issues for the homeless visitors are difficulties with responsibilities such as keeping an agenda, to show up on time for appointments and to stick to agreements, to take care of ones finances in a sustainable fashion and to take care of hygiene and physical health.

evident to many in order to experience well-being and self-reliance<sup>87</sup> are for most of the visitors a problem. The visitors are not well-equipped to be homo economici<sup>88</sup>, an entrepreneur of their own life project.

Besides agency related problems there are societal- or structural barriers which are problematic<sup>89</sup> to the visitors. An example of a particular practical material barrier is the public transport chip card which was carried into full effect in 2014. Somebody need to use a chip card<sup>90</sup> as a method of payment to use the Netherlands public transport, which means you need a chipcard to acces all trains, buses, trams and subways in the country. For example at train- or subway stations one should have the credit card sized chip card scanned at mechanical entrance gates in order to have those opened to enter the station.<sup>92</sup> In other words: in case one lacks such a chip card (or credit balance on the card), a train station, it's platforms and hence the trains are a no-go area. Before the introduction of the public transport chip card visitors could relatively easy, with or without a ticket, travel on trains and trams and find shelter (and beg or hustle) in the hubs which the train stations are in the bigger cities. Arnold considers barriers such as the public transport chipcard there is a disappearance of true public space, and hence of citizenship. (Arnold, 2004). I refer to the design of spatial arrangements because visitors and other deviating people are considered as nuisance in public – which is turning progressively into private – space and hence they are confronted with increasing measures to avert them from these spaces.<sup>93</sup>Current

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<sup>87</sup> Though quite a few homeless visitors are verbally strong and charming.

<sup>88</sup> See paragraph 1.7.

<sup>89</sup> In some cases the situation of the homeless people is *de facto* hopeless, for example for failed asylum seekers who are on the run from the police and will sooner or later be caught and extradited out of the European Union or at least be locked up in alien detention.

<sup>90</sup> Although most people in The Netherlands are using a personalised chipcard, which carries the identity information of the owner, in March 2017 it is (still) possible to use a so called anonymous chipcard. However, only in a few big trainstations the cards can be uploaded with cash money. In other words, in case one wants to use the public transportcard regularly one needs a bankcard to charge the chipcard. Many homeless people do not have a bankcard because they do not have an adress or the right identitypapers to open a bankaccount.

<sup>91</sup> The Dutch public transport chipcard is a method of self-control and discipline.

<sup>92</sup> And hence is a disciplinary practice (Foucault, 1977) as one is registered where one is at what time for how long and where one travels to. It is a good example of a contemporary advance of normalizing behavior as nowadays travellers function as railway guards taking care to pay for the ride.

<sup>93</sup> In last decades a transition has occurred in which former public space increasingly became privately owned. A well-known example is the Canary Wharf business district in London, which is owned and managed by private parties and controlled by private security companies. (Luyendijk, 2015). In the context of Utrecht one might consider that the central train station is surrounded by an extensive privately owned shopping mall. The interior of this space is not considered public and private security companies are working besides the local police. I consider this relevant because a private company, who manage for example a shopping mall, serve other purposes than public sector services like the

developments result in more repressive policies towards homeless people. Homeless people are for example exposed to a 'keep moving policy' in which the police admonishes – referring to public-order crime - the homeless to, obviously, keep moving.<sup>94</sup> Homeless people may be fined in case they are staying – causing trouble or resting - in a place. *'Where social safety nets can be spotty, ad hoc, and occasionally Kafkaesque affairs, where people without shelter sometimes have no other recourse than (...) prohibited activities, homelessness itself becomes a petty crime.'* (Boarder Giles, 2013. P.123). Regulation and prohibition leads to criminalization. (Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011). There is an increase in prohibition policies. Within such regimes visitors will develop financial debts which cannot be redeemed<sup>95</sup> and because of that the visitors will be sooner or later detained (again). (Beckett, 1997, Beckett & Herbert, 2010, Willse, 2015, Boarder Giles, 2016, Margiers, A. 2016 Langegger, S. & S. Koester. 2016, et al.). For example, in The Netherlands not paying for public health insurancefees, sleeping outdoors, to gather – two people together can be considered a gathering in The Netherlands - urinating and using alcohol or drugs in public will be fined. (Mol, 2005). However in case one is (an addicted) homeless it is quite hard to avoid such situations<sup>96</sup> and it is likely a visitor will be considered a 'habitual offender'.<sup>97</sup> The Dutch Ministry of Justice for example describes that a *'new legal arrangement came into effect to expel the group of active habitual offender's long term out of [society]. Habitual offenders are to be recognized as such as early as possible. Good registration by the police is therefore necessary. (...)*

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police or a municipality. So in case the police or a municipality is willing to have a nuanced approach to socially vulnerable people, a private party will obviously not prioritize communal ideals but foremostly economic interests.

Beckett mentions that (t)he deployment of the new control tools—touted by proponents as alternatives to arrest and punishment—has a “net-widening” effect: it creates crimes and criminal cases that would not otherwise exist. Taken together, these techniques represent a dramatic extension of the state's authority and surveillance capacity throughout the urban landscape. The punitive city (...) is one in which an increasing number of acts are regulated and criminalized; the state's ability to search, detain, regulate, and monitor is expanded; and a system of invisible yet highly consequential gates and barriers increasingly constrains the movement of some urbanites in public space.' (Beckett & Herbert. 2010, p.11).

<sup>94</sup> The author considers the keep-moving policy as incentive to consider homeless people if so desired as criminals because of public-disorder. The impression of many of the visitors seems to be that public-order crime criminalizes and stigmatizes minority groups and that it is prosecuted selectively.

<sup>95</sup> Homeless people lack in general the financial power to pay back debts.

<sup>96</sup> It is not otiose to point out this development is quite wicked if one considers homeless people lack a private home and therefore can in general not dwell in other spaces than public space. Hence Lefebvre's coinage 'right to the city' (Kaulingfreks, F. 2013) appears very relevant in the context of homelessness in Dutch cities.

<sup>97</sup> Since 2004 in The Netherlands a cumulation of small, petty crimes like theft, but as well public-order crimes can be cause for detention under the label of being a 'habitual offender'. The term 'habitual offender' got common since the turn of the millennium. (Ferwerda et al, 2003).



*Habitual offenders will be handled as quickly as possible with effective penalties to stop the habitual offending and to prevent them to develop a criminal career. (...) With this measure the group can be deprived longer of its freedom. Effectively the committing of new crimes will be factually impossible for longer periods.*' (Justitie.nl, 2004).<sup>98</sup> Although this factsheet is introduced almost 15 years ago I find it a suitable illustration for the 'decisive'<sup>99</sup> (and biopolitical) jargon which is in vogue in the common political discourse in The Netherlands and other European countries since the 2000s. The policy described here is disconcertingly simple and blunt; to detain people who commit petty crime in order to achieve a smaller occurrence of criminal acts and to prevent the offenders from '*developing a criminal career*'. (Ibid.) It appears increasingly common to be considered a habitual offender because of the more repressive regime of monitoring – consider here the introduction of the public transport chip card and the keep moving policy - and arresting. It appears that the goal of these policies is that the criminal behavior is tackled before it becomes 'habitual', in other words there is less tolerance for deviant behavior. It is relevant to point out that most of the visitors are in fact known to the welfare institutions and local authorities, but that their 'recognition' and proper 'registration' is de facto the problematic issue, for example for numerous illegal immigrants whom are by default a bureaucratic impossibility, but as well that many visitors are anyways in a perpetual struggle with various welfare institutions and some 'persistently avoid care'. It is not that they are not known for their deviant behavior; there exist a problem of organizing the right kinds of care.<sup>100</sup> Instead of realising this difficulty, ex- and implicitly homelessness is criminalized instead of being considered a wicked problem. Kyle mentions policymakers should be aware of the stigmatizing effects of criminalization and begs for a awareness that a deviant will become, almost by default, a lawbreaker.<sup>101</sup> (2005). Compared to

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<sup>98</sup> Source:

[https://web.archive.org/web/20050507195228/http://www.justitie.nl/publicaties/brochures\\_en\\_factsheets/factsheet\\_s/aanpakveelplegers.asp](https://web.archive.org/web/20050507195228/http://www.justitie.nl/publicaties/brochures_en_factsheets/factsheet_s/aanpakveelplegers.asp), consulted 07.04.2017.

<sup>99</sup> Which can be considered a development away from the nowadays often denounced tolerant approach within the more progressive policies of the 1990s. The real impact of the 'tough' words will be problematized though, as I will show that there are methodological problems in this regard.

<sup>100</sup> See for example the description of the movie 'The Cats of Mirikitani' at the end of paragraph 1.6.

<sup>101</sup> "Edwin Schur argues that ' (...) the relation between deviance and public policy is reciprocal" (1965, p. 8). The definition of behavior as 'criminal' is an extreme form of stigmatization. Defining behavior as 'deviant' has profound effects on those individuals engaging in it (...). Even when he [sic] is not publicly identified and officially dealt with, he is only too aware that his behavior is legally proscribed as well as socially disapproved. Sensing that he is different or is doing an unusual act is one thing; feeling that his act is strongly disapproved is another; and knowledge that he has become a lawbreaker yet another." (Schur, 1965. P.5,8, in Kyle, 2005. P.23)

some cities in the U.S., there is no general anti-homelessness legislation applied in The Netherlands. But that is not surprising, as such a legislation would beg for a concession from the Dutch government as partly responsible to avoid homelessness. To summarize: *'(H)omelessness is frequently treated as a problem of social control. In this case homeless people are labeled as disorderly or disabled and reformed, treated, or contained accordingly. Alternatively, homelessness is often considered to be a social crisis to which the state is obligated to respond.'* (Margier 2016. P.149). We can recognize Willse's description of homelessness as social crisis. *'(L)ocal governments strive to provide health, human, and housing services to residents who are homeless. Finally, homelessness is framed as a problem of property zoning, urban design, and land use regulation. Under this rubric, municipal responses to homelessness range from urban design decisions, such as uncomfortably short park benches, half-walls laden with iron spikes, to public space management protocols like park watering regimes timed to roust sleeping people, to a raft of public space regulations ranging from anti-loitering bylaws, "sit & lie" ordinances, panhandling codes, park curfews, public health codes, and camping bans.'* (Ibid.).

I think that in a governmental perspective order and security felonies are more productive to adjust the behavior of deviant people than a general ban of homelessness. In order to summarize with a self-evidence, a tautology: vulnerable people are most vulnerable<sup>102</sup> to those intolerant policies.<sup>103</sup> That is probably the reason why visitors come to the shelter: To have a coffee or have a soup, to take a shower, to get clean clothes, to have a chat or to play a board game. In other words, to have a breathing space, a little rest for the time being.<sup>104</sup> (Hacquebord, 2008). Visitors are experiencing stress perpetually. Visitors often exhibit survival oriented behavior and therefore do not have the energy and peace of mind to make long-term commitments to improve their situation.

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<sup>102</sup> And by the way vulnerable to aggressive behaviour of other homeless people in their surroundings.

<sup>103</sup> Consider for example that habitual offender *'laws, depending on their scope and discretionary room given to judges, can lead to persons being punished quite severely for relatively minor offenses. The discretionary nature of the laws means that they can be applied unevenly.'* Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitual\\_offender](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitual_offender), consulted on 07.04.2017.

See as well the relevant Guardians article *'In a new era of official nastiness, it's suddenly a crime to be homeless'* by John Harris on: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/nastiness-crime-homeless-homelessness-local-authorities-public-spaces-protection-orders>, consulted on 22.05.2017.

<sup>104</sup> The implicit deal with the local police is that police will only enter the shelter in exceptional situations. The shelter is so to say a freehaven from police and social institutions. In case the homeless visitor hides inside the shelter while being chased by police, the police has to wait outside the shelter until the suspected visitor comes out of the shelter. The other homeless visitors and the volunteers there will make clear that it is no use to wait the whole day inside, as the shelter closes at 6pm everyday.

A less visible but relevant example of a complex agency related problem is that many visitors are having mental health disorders combined with drug- or alcohol addictions.<sup>105</sup> (Bhugra, D. 2007). A homeless person often needs to 'fulfill' a therapy in order to successfully attend another therapy. For example, a psychologist working with a homeless person on a mental health problem might expect a visitor to tackle a drug- or alcohol addiction first in order for the mental healthcare treatment to be productive. (Ibid). Whereas the homeless person probably need a drug to suppress their mental problems. On the other hand, a rehabilitation therapist will probably consider that the mental problems ought to come to a grip before a drug- or alcohol addiction can be treated<sup>106</sup> This tendency is a rather persistent catch-22 situation<sup>107</sup> in which homeless person are often moved from pillar to post - much to the dismay of the person.<sup>108</sup> *'The temptation to look at only one module of homelessness and singular linear causality leading to homelessness must be resisted.'* (Bhugra, 2007. P.xv). Though these issues indicate on the one hand an agency problem of the homeless people, the lack or even impossibility of suitable mental healthcare might be considered a structural problem.<sup>109</sup> *'The treatment of people with both mental illness and substance abuse or dependence (...) perplexes service providers in community psychiatry programs*

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<sup>105</sup> Bhugra writes that '(h)omeless individuals with substance misuse problems are often seen as 'undeserving', and consequently have been poorly served by services. Although substance misuse was a prominent finding in Breakey et al.'s (1989) study, only one third of men and one tenth of women had recently obtained residential or ambulatory care for a substance misuse problem. Mavis et al. (1993) used residential mobility to identify 'homeless out of a total of 938 subjects. Compared to housed clients, the homeless were more likely to be seeking admission to residential substance abuse programmes and a much larger proportion reported previous treatment for alcohol or drug problems.' (Bhugra, D. 2007. P. 103).

<sup>106</sup> Consider for example as well Willse's remark, that 'case management programmes have frequently mandated treatment for psychiatric disabilities and drug/alcohol use, as such conditions and behaviours have especially been understood as barriers to what is called 'housing readiness'. Thus, sobriety and compliance with psychiatric drug regimes have frequently been pre-conditions for admittance to housing programmes and minimum requirements for remaining housed. Finally, housing programmes have typically included enforced waking and sleep times, limits or bans on outside visitors and bans on sexual activity.' (Willse, C. 2010. P.166).

<sup>107</sup> A catch-22 situation is 'a situation in which one needs to fulfil two actions which are reciprocally dependent on the other action, where one action needs to be fulfilled to accomplish the other mission.' (Nieuwenhuizen, 2010).

<sup>108</sup> 'Theresa Funicello (...) has referred to the social service model of welfare provision as a 'tyranny of kindness', signalling the coercive nature of paternalistic programmes that demand submission to reform protocols in the name of the client's own good. Funicello's term perfectly expresses the contradictions of disciplinary power as described by Foucault that humanist projects of developing mental and physical capacities proceed through projects of submission and control, such that we come to understand that it is only through submission that the subject can be improved and liberated.' (Willse, C. 2010. P.166).

<sup>109</sup> I would like to stress a possible dichotomy between agency and structure is not clear-cut and the described narratives are oscillating agency and structural issues. I will avoid to let any of the two prevail over the other. However, in this research I will put the agency related problems of the homeless visitors as a given. As I describe policies and politics I will focus on societal descriptions.

generally.’<sup>110 111</sup>(Bhugra, 2007. P. 123).

As a to be social scientist and potentially a social worker I experienced it confronting and eye opening that despite the diversity of the people visiting the shelter where I worked – Bhugra writes that the *‘homeless population is heterogeneous, disaffiliated from society and lacks trust in the statutory services’* (2007, p.100) - many of the visitors hold negative attitudes toward various government- and social welfare institutions. (Mol, 2005). The following observation is a major motivation for the forthcoming research: regardless of many good intentions of volunteers and professionals and a diverse range of welfare organizations, the service of these organizations altogether is apparently not sufficient to assist the visitors in overcoming their complex problems. So on the one hand there are various institutions aiming to [re-integrate] the homeless persons, while the other, and I will consider even *the same*, institutions and developments are obstructing people in their movements and peace. According to Van Duin it occurs that in case one is in need of various (among others medical-, rehabilitation-, financial-, family- and legal-) support, care turns into a regime of a full workweek to address all the different social-, civil-, and health practitioners, which makes it rather difficult to keep up with in case one is not well-equipped to do so. (2010). Imagine one is having serious physical - hence one is tired often - and mental disorders, for example being paranoid: it is a bit of a cheap joke here but that *‘they’* are relentlessly following you is really the case. At least in the Dutch [society] the welfare institutions have realized this inconvenient situation and aimed to tackle this unproductive situation with the establishment of, something typical biopolitical, what I label as *‘secretary-manager-coach social worker’* which assists a client to keep their agenda in order to manage the meetings with other social workers, civil servants, creditors and health practitioners in order to make the therapies more productive. (Van Duin, 2010). Put bluntly; [re-integrating] is a full workweek which prevents one from developing an

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<sup>110</sup> For example: *‘Cognitive impairment is another important factor that is often unrecognized in the homeless mentally ill. In one study, nearly 40% of homeless men with a mean age of 55 years had severe or mild cognitive impairment and more than one in four showed severe cognitive impairment (...). Of the group, 15% had alcohol related problems and 21 % had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The figures for dual diagnosis were not reported.’* (Bhugra, D. 2007. P.103).

<sup>111</sup> However, I would like to stress that I do not want to elaborate on the psychological well-being of homeless people or to write about the destructive aspects of substance abuse, as I am no psychologist nor health professional. I do not even want to elaborate in the very interesting, frustrating but interesting catch-22 situation between mental health care and rehabilitation therapy. I do not want to focus on a particular problematic aspect of mental healthcare, and neither for ex-ample on the (dire) results of the financial cuts on this sector and the increase in homelessness as immediate result. (Bhugra, 2007). Neither will I propose a best-practice which will, with a positivism which is almost magical, solve organizational or [societal] problems.

informal social network - don't forget the welfare state as caring state is passé<sup>112</sup> and hence such is paramount nowadays to receive care and support - or free time to search for a job. Or even just the peace of mind to try to get energy to deal with life. To summarize: Homeless people are, considering the impressions gained during my work at the shelter, often people without the skills to have a productive lifestyle - like keeping a job and a dwelling, to manage a household and finances in a prudential fashion, to stay in touch with family and friends whom can be a beacon of informal care, and find it hard not to be perpetually in contact with police and the justice department. These people experience often an entangling combination<sup>113</sup> of for example mental problems, substance abuse, poor social skills and repressive biopolitical policies. Visitors often have very negative attitudes towards authorities and their respective professionals. Criminalization and structural barriers obstruct homeless people in their peace, privacy and freedom.

Although the further research and its conclusion will relate and possibly be relevant to the above mentioned issues I have another aim with this research. Inspired by my background in social work I aim to write a philosophically inspired case study regarding [in-] and [exclusion] of the physical and the cultural implications of [society]. Namely, what is the [society] - I will discuss in the forthcoming literature analysis of theoretical sociologist Willem Schinkel- am referring to? Does such even exist, and why is it so persistent in contemporary descriptions? Is that essential for biopolitics? Why this question is relevant is that namely, to my initial astonishment, quite some visitors seemed acquiescent with their lives - and inter alia confronted me with the relativity of idea or concept [society] - though it seems various institutions to [re-integrate] the visitors into [society] seem not to allow such a relative and pragmatic stance, either theoretically or ethically. Might that be a cause for the frictions (Bhugra, 2007) between the experience of visitors and of health professionals and social workers?

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<sup>112</sup> See paragraph 1.7.

<sup>113</sup> Because of such factors homeless people *'have poorer health status; higher rates of physical illness, mental illness, and substance abuse; and earlier mortality when compared to the general public.'* (Karaca et al, 2013).

### §1.7 narratives: three stories about ones places in [society]

*'Homeless, what's that? We are just a moving communal living arrangement.'*<sup>114</sup>

Willem.<sup>115</sup>

I will narrate in this paragraph two cases which introduce the problem of description of homelessness from personal work experiences. These stories were the motivation for this research. The narratives serve as the last part of the first chapter introducing the complexity of contextualizing homelessness in [society] and a description of neoliberalism as post-political biopolitics.

As an elderly man Ronald's<sup>116</sup> face is very wrinkly. Although he is a Dutch man - we share our mother tongue - we somehow did not communicate much with each other during my shifts at the shelter. Maybe we did not have a good understanding, but it might be very likely that Ronald was just shy. Or maybe too tired to be social? Maybe he just could not be bothered with the *nth* volunteer or social work trainee at the various shelters he frequented or maybe he just found me annoying. On some days he appeared rather confused and not really present with his attention. He always wore, irregardless of the weather, a winter jacket with a hoody over his head, in a way that his eyes were covered by it, alike 'Kenny', the infamous character of the South park cartoons. In other words, I saw only his nose and mouth when I served him coffee and soup in the shelter. Until that night we spoke in a cafe I never really got to know him any better: "It was a sunny day in the medieval center of Utrecht and Driss, the coordinator of the shelter with whom I liked to have a beer after work shifts, and I were sitting on a terrace at one of Utrecht's medieval canals. Ronald walked by and recognized Driss. Driss swiftly invited him for a drink and discretely informed the bartenders that Ronald was our guest that night; He was drinking on Driss' bill as crowd in the bar initially looked suspicious at this odd looking man. We had quite a few drinks and Ronald mentio-

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<sup>114</sup> Margier writes that one 'of the homeless people she interviewed relates how the camp in which he was living was the only type of family he had ever known. Following an eviction of the camp, he moved inside. He now has a roof on his head but has lost his only social network, and still considers himself homeless. By expressing the fact that some homeless people prefer to stay outside, Dooling does not however romanti- cise homelessness. As shelters are often experienced as spaces of violence and constraints, many homeless people prefer to stay in public spaces. It is the only place where they are able to find a dwelling space they can share with others and experience a sense of home.' (Margier, A. 2016.P.67).

<sup>115</sup> Mol, R & A. Neutel. 2005. P.89.

<sup>116</sup> Ronald is not his real name, neither is Driss'.

ned several times it was such a positive surprise for him to be invited and have a talk and some beers. Initially he kept his 'Kenny' hoody on, but at some point he took it off - though he kept his winter jacket on the whole night, irregardless of the warm weather and the fact that we moved into the crowded pub after the night fell. Anyways, for the first time I saw his face: an old, bald man. He told us his youth has been rough. He left his parents when he was a young man. He travelled the world as a sailor and worked as engineer in various countries. While working in Latin America he witnessed how a police officer tortured a street child to death. He said that up to today he relives that experience and that he just cannot understand how somebody could do something cruel like that. He was crying when he told it. I felt sorry for him and wanted to change the topic - maybe just because I got uncomfortable looking at a wrinkly old man sobbing; I asked him where else had he lived - before being homeless?<sup>117</sup> He seemed kind of surprised by my question; as it was very obvious and therefore stupid to ask. Ronald responded: *'But I live in Utrecht. I live in Utrecht longer than you are around on this planet, and I know any street here: Utrecht is my home. I know many people here.'* I have probably uttered something like 'I meant a place to live, like a house', but realized it was silly, and moreover: that I applied my idea of normality to him. Ronald made basically clear that life had been rough to him and that now he was fine the way he lives. That he does not need to 'fit into' my normative<sup>118</sup> assumption, because he already fitted quite fine in Utrecht. After that night Ronald went back to generally ignoring me, maybe not even recognizing me any longer, and as I left Utrecht for Lapland, I do not know how he is doing. The last time I saw him walking the streets with a small West Highland white terrier. But I learned something which I want to apply in this thesis, namely that he felt he belonged, that he was home, on the streets of Utrecht. He was not misplaced: my question about where he was living was misplaced instead."

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<sup>117</sup> Talking to a homeless person is quite a difficult skill as usually one investigates about meaning and sense of direction in life, such as 'where do you live', 'what kind of job do you have' and 'what are your ambitions', 'are you dating somebody or do you have a partner' or 'what are your hobbies'. Instead of keeping a conversation going asking such questions to a homeless person lead to awkward moments, as such 'meaningful directions' are lacking as most homeless people are not able to maintain jobs, money to do things, friendships and privacy. In other words, they seem to lack a future perspective in life.

<sup>118</sup> Normativity is a common thing though: as home-less is a negative word (Bauman, 2015), like ex-clusive or unemployed, it makes, etymologically speaking, immediately clear what is the norm. Kyle mentions as well that homelessness implies that 'homedness' is the normal state. (Kyle, 2005). *'In this way, having a home is made to appear as a static or inherent quality, not a contingent social arrangement.'* (Kyle, 2005. P.25).

Another person who made a lasting impression to me is Jonathan.<sup>119</sup> Jonathan is a Dutch man with Indonesian roots. He is bright. He likes reading newspapers in the municipal library. He does not use any alcohol or drugs. After I met him the first time in the shelter he mentioned 'it is nice to talk to somebody who is thinking a bit, as I am surrounded in daily life by drunkards, drug dealers and criminals.' We often played a game of chess at the shelter. When he had a bad night with little sleep – he boycotts the various designated night shelters and hence sleeps in places outdoors found by himself – I had a chance to win, but in case he slept well he usually won. When I met him in the morning at the central train station of Utrecht we often had a breakfast together, to the point where Jonathan was just waiting outside the bakery where we often 'accidentally' met.

Indonesia is a former colony of the Netherlands, and like Jonathan, there are many people with Indonesian roots living in the Netherlands. Jonathan studied cultural anthropology when he was a young man, where he learned about the atrocities of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world. He got depressed and decided that 'he wanted to have nothing to do with the Dutch government or [society].' I think Jonathan is suffering from paranoid personality disorder, but my pseudo-psychological intuition is not relevant for this study. What I found very interesting but likewise saddening, as he does not even look or act like a 'bum', is that because of his need to be as autarkic as possible he is in a permanent struggle with the Dutch government and its various welfare institutions. Jonathan seems to request a status-quo; 'let me have my basic rights, and leave me alone for the rest, as I do not want or expect anything else from Dutch [society].' Mostly Jonathan wants a minimal dole by the Dutch government to rent a house, to which he is entitled to as a Dutch citizen, but currently lacks any (id-)papers and an official place of residence. Hence, as he lacks a social security number and postal address, he cannot work legally, he cannot have a phone contract, and he cannot receive hardcopy mail nor open a bank account. As such he cannot travel on public transport. At the outset Jonathan is not doing anything illegal but because of the criminalization of homelessness and his seclusive and erratic behavior he is in a perpetual struggle with the Dutch authorities. So though Jonathan does not steal or use drugs or alcohol and does not cause any nuisance in public space he is 'left without care', not even the little care he wants and needs. I think he *became* so to say an habitual offender because of his strong need to be left alone. This is a frustrating paradoxical spiral for both Jonathan and all professionals surroun-

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<sup>119</sup> Jonathan is not his real name.



ding him. For example, when Jonathan considers that somebody like a social worker or -trainee invades his privacy and does not respect his views on life, and that person is insisting their 'service' or 'care' on him he will eventually beat the social worker or civil servant as he knows that will end him 'blacklisted' for a while. That means that he won't be bothered for the time being by some authorities, until after a certain amount of time he appears again on the radar of a social worker, police agent or mental health practitioner. Jonathan seems to be stuck as he somehow cannot break through the cycle of criminalization and to for him counterproductive social work as no care seems to be customized for him, or respects his worldview for that matter. The social welfare institutions seem persistent to [integrate] Jonathan into a more productive life though. It's like a taboo to admit there is no sufficient care and neither need for some 'unadjusted' people. As if some persistent fallacies of our [societies] are not allowed to be spoken about openly.

The documentary 'Cats of Mirikitani' of 2006 offers an interesting biopolitical context similar to Ronald and Jonathan's situation, but the relevant aspect of this documentary is that it shows the bureaucratic struggle of a homeless particularly clear.

Linda Hattendorf started filming Jimmy Mirikitani in the summer of 2001. Mirikitani is then over 80 years old. He lives on the streets of Manhattan. He is born in Sacramento, California in a family of immigrants of Japanese descent. Mirikitani is raised in Hiroshima. When Mirikitani turns 18 years old, his family takes care he lives in the United States again – Mirikitani has the U.S. citizenship – to evade the conscription of militaristic pre-WW2 Japan. Artistic and gentle Mirikitani plans to study art in the United States instead. After the Pearl Harbor attacks Mirikitani's US citizenship, among 120.000 other Japanese Americans<sup>120</sup>, was renounced and he was interned for 3.5 years in a U.S. concentration camp during World War two. In a letter to request his release from the internment camp Mirikitani writes that *'I am studying to become an artist, to combine traditions of East of West in the free world. With such high ambition I came back to my native country.'* Unfortunately Mirikitani's U.S. citizenship was only restored in 1959, but Mirikitani never received that information: the letter to him was undeliverable because he changed often addresses over the years.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internment\\_of\\_Japanese\\_Americans#cite\\_note-howmany-5](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internment_of_Japanese_Americans#cite_note-howmany-5), consulted on 01.06.2017.

<sup>121</sup> *'Executive Order 9066 forced Jimmy and his sister to leave their home and move to separate internment camps hundreds of miles apart. (...) When the government required internees to take a loyalty test, Tule Lake became a segregation center where those deemed "disloyal" were congregated. Thousands there renounced their US citizenship in protest. Jimmy was one of these renunciants. After the war ended, Jimmy and hundreds of others continued to be*

Mirikitani became homeless in 1980 and earned money making paintings about the internment camps, and cats. The documentary shows he *'won't take money (as beggar), except for his art (-sales).'* Mirikitani as elderly man expresses his anger about the internment camps; *'How do you explain put American citizens into camps, and die? 18.000 people in my camp died!'*<sup>122</sup>

When 9/11 occurred Linda Hattendorf met Mirikitani on his usual spot near a Korean corner store on the then deserted dust-clouded streets after the collapse of the twin towers. Hattendorf invites Mirikitani to stay at her small apartment. She films a clip from a U.S. newsprogramme that narrates that *'a measure of racial profiling is necessary in response to 9/11'* to which Mirikitani mumbles *'it is just like what happened after Pearl Harbor.'* Mirikitani slumbers at Hattendorf for months while she organizes that Mirikitani can live in a retirement home for elderly people. The most striking and relevant scene of the movie in a biopolitical perspective, besides the postponement of rights during WW2 and after 9/11, is that Hattendorf tries to get Mirikitani signed up for elderly care. Jimmy Mirikitani does not seem to be interested in that though; the conversation at the 'check in' for elderly care goes as follows (2006):

Hattendorf: *'He has become homeless since he was a young adult. He is not involved in any community agency.'*

Mirikitani: *'I got no need for a social security number, I'm quite strong.'*

Social worker trying to register Mirikitani talks to Hattendorf: *'Hardly any retirement homes take elderly homeless people.'* Turns to Mirikitani: *'In order for a social security number, you need an id card, an identity card with your age on it.'*

Mirikitani: *'Never went to social security. I don't need social security.'*

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held without charge, first in Tule Lake, then in a Department of Justice INS camp in Crystal City, Texas. A single lawyer, Wayne Collins, worked for decades to help Jimmy and 5,000 other renunciants reclaim the citizenship they had given up under duress. In 1946, Jimmy was transferred to Seabrook Farms, a frozen food manufacturing plant near Bridgeton New Jersey. Here he and other renunciants on "relaxed internment" worked the 12 hour night shift, 6 days a week, sorting vegetables on an assembly line. By August 1947, Collins won their release, but fully restoring their citizenship took another decade. Jimmy's US citizenship was finally restored in 1959, but by then he had moved so often that the government's letter never reached him. Eventually Jimmy became a live-in cook on Park Avenue. But when his employer died in the late 1980's, Jimmy was suddenly without a home or a job. (...) Within a year, he was living in Washington Square Park in Greenwich Village, selling his artwork to survive. He met filmmaker Linda Hattendorf in Soho in 2001. She helped him apply for Social Security, SSI, and housing benefits, and in 2002 he moved into an assisted-living retirement center run by Village Care of New York. Later that year, he was reunited with his sister Kazuko for the first time in 60 years. Both Jimmy and his sister passed away in 2012, ten years after they were reunited.'

Source: <http://www.thecatsofmirikitani.com/aboutFilm.htm>, consulted on 12.05.2017.

<sup>122</sup> Elderly Mirikitani speaks so to say 'broken' English.

Social worker (looks to Hattendorf): *'He really does not want it. (Looks to Mirikitani) We want to find out your benefits, like social security and things like that, so we could help you. Do you want to help us to find a place to live?'*

Mirikitani: *'no thank, no thank you.'*

Social worker: *'Why not?'*

Mirikitani: *'No need, no need, no need for passport.'* (Mirikitani refuses to sit down in the office while they social workers hint him to do so).

Social worker: *'Do you have a social security number, or card?'*

Mirikitani: *'I got a social security number.'* (Mirikitani seems inconsistent here, but the social worker clears up and looks happy suddenly). *'No need to help, no need to help.'* Mirikitani starts talking about art.

Social worker: *'A social security would give you some money that you could have.'*

Mirikitani: *'They took everything; my passport. You are an American citizen: They cannot take. They took it! They took everything! U.S. government cut their citizenships: go to Japan!'*<sup>123</sup> *I don't need American U.S. passport; it's garbage this country. After the war, we had to go to an internment camp.*<sup>124</sup>

Especially Mirikitani's story, considering the revoking of his passport, and to some extent Jonathan's story too, illustrate a state racism described by Foucault: how easily people can turn into bare life; into bodies without rights, where a sovereign power - in this case a biopolitical-sovereign-whom-does-not-want-sovereignty-but-political-and-social-order - annuls citizen rights. (Agamben, 2005). Both Jonathan and Mirikitani were initially citizens but because of some problematic developments they lost that right. I have highlighted the failed 'check in' of Mirikitani at the elderly home to illustrate the difficulty to deal in a bureaucracy with people without the right identity papers: as *sans papiers* do not fit into a bureaucracy they are devoid of institutionalized care. But *bare life* is obviously denied rights. However, from a governmental

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<sup>123</sup> Japanese American '(r)enunciations were denied counsel, the right to be represented or advised an attorney or have any legal advice whatsoever. 7 out of 10 Japanese citizens born in US gave up their US citizenship.' Source: <http://www.thecatsofmirikitani.com/aboutFilm.htm>, consulted on 12.05.2017.

<sup>124</sup> Hattendorf get after this unfruitful conversation by coincidence in contact with Mirikitani's sister, who happened to be still alive and lives on the U.S. Westcoast. His sister lost contact with Mirikitani after they were put in different concentration camps. Through his sister Hattendorf learns more about Mirikitani and with that information she is able to successfully apply for Mirikitani's social security eventually. (2005).

perspective, let us put it as a Foucaultian perspective, this is not the sole, and not the most sophisticated, biopolitical problem.

Even if there might be diversions (as bureaucracy is never as tight as it 'ideally' should be) (Ten Bos & Kaulingfreks, 2001) Jonathan' and Mirikitani's stories express how hard it is for people living in precarious and disadvantaged circumstances and capabilities to have the serenity, willingness and discipline to find their way to get recognition and the status they deserve. I write deliberately 'recognition' here and not per se care, because that is not per se the highest priority of the described men: What I found most striking is that, like Ronald, Mirikitani, feels he has a meaningful life on the street, selling his art and having a social life, whereas not 'fitting in' officially by a governmental- and welfare system. This is alike Ronald and Jonathan; though they admit they have certain problems in life, their position in the world seems to make more sense to them than to the whole arrangement of professionals surrounding them. So, on the one hand, structural violence such as revoking identity papers and criminalization, and the general impossibility to deal with illegal people in western nation states, are very relevant problems regarding homelessness, but on the other hand the impossibility to organize good care is a related relevant problem. Shall we consider the imaginative poverty to describe homelessness by institutions, politics and media as a stigmatizing effect for example?<sup>125</sup> Bhugra mentions that the '*provision of comprehensive services for the mentally ill homeless is time-consuming and complex. However, it is also an opportunity to be innovative and flexible and may, in time, serve to inform the development of the standard mental health services.*' (2007. P.107). In the following chapter, which will function as the theoretical core of this study, we will do an attempt to be innovative and flexible with the application of critical philosophy.

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<sup>125</sup> Consider for example Willse's remark that '(p)eople living without shelter have especially been understood as incapable of self-management. Media and government accounts depict 'the homeless' as possessing failed selves that require invasive social assistance. Many decades of formal and informal policy have made treatment for substance abuse and psychiatric disabilities a mandatory condition for entering and remaining in housing programmes. Such earlier policy argued that drug / alcohol and psychiatric treatment, as well as social service programmes focused on money management, job training and a wide range of other so-called life skills, make formerly 'shelter-resistant' individuals 'housing- ready'. (Willse, C. 2010. P.156).

## Chapter 2: [society] for itself

### §2.1 [society] as myth

*'Is it possible to define a totality, or must we be content with reconstituting connections?'*

Michel Foucault.<sup>126</sup>

*'What fits into nothing is real.'*

Jules Deelder.<sup>127</sup>

*'We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure.'*

Gilles Deleuze.<sup>128</sup>

*'We may wish to draw a dividing-line; but any limit we set may perhaps be no more than an arbitrary division made in a constantly mobile whole. We may wish to mark off a period; but have we the right to establish symmetrical breaks at two points in time in order to give an appearance of continuity and unity to the system we place between them? Where, in that case, would the cause of its existence lie? Or that of its subsequent disappearance and fall? What rule could it be obeying by both its existence and its disappearance? If it contains a principle of coherence within itself, whence could come the foreign element capable of rebutting it? How can a thought melt away before anything other than itself? Generally speaking, what does it mean, no longer being able to think a certain thought? Or to introduce a new thought?'*

Michel Foucault.<sup>129</sup>

The forthcoming theoretical consideration will deepen the practical rooted descriptions and critique of last paragraphs. As mentioned in the former chapter we will not research how to improve

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<sup>126</sup> Foucault, M. 1969. P4.

<sup>127</sup> Adjustment of a one sentence poem by the Dutch beatpoet Jules Deelder. (2012). The poem literally translates as: *'What appears like nothing is real'* (In Dutch language: *'wat nergens op lijkt, is echt'*).

<sup>128</sup> Deleuze, G. 1992. P.3.

<sup>129</sup> Foucault, M. 2005. P. 56.

social work directly: We will question the literal self-evidence<sup>130</sup> of [society].<sup>131</sup> A direction for thought about the problematized framing of biopolitical (inclusion) will be sketched through a critique of the application of [society]. Is [society] as discourse needed in order to apply an allegedly 'neutral'<sup>132</sup> analytical grid necessary for governmentality? What is the space and the boundary of biopower? Our sober task is to investigate how a discourse functions in which one, or in fact many, have to adjust *into*, and with that demand 'forgot' or deny they were already *there*.<sup>133</sup> I consider Foucault's notion of dispersed events<sup>134</sup> as similar to my description of a rhizomatic horizontal<sup>135</sup> multiplicity as alternative notion for [society].<sup>136</sup>

[Society] imagined as closed and comprehensive system developed along the rise of modern nation states.<sup>137</sup> (Schinkel, 2007). According to Schinkel the dominant metaphor for [societies]

<sup>130</sup> *What are being analysed here are certainly not the terminal states of discourse; they are the preterminal regularities in relation to which the ultimate state, far from constituting the birth-place of a system, is defined by its variants.* (Foucault, 1973. P.84).

Self-evidence in this context should be taken as literal as can: as something which is referring to itself.

<sup>131</sup> Not without the hope that such an endeavour might improve social work! I would like to stress that I am not a priori against social work or welfare assistance and neither about a critical assessment of its quality, but in the stories of Jonathan, Mirikitani and Ronald it became clear there is a biopolitical problem which is not defined by the homeless men themselves, but by the bureaucracy of welfare institutions and the legal system, in other words by governance.

<sup>132</sup> Social work, like all interference with humans, is a political matter but it is described as if it is neutral, for example as 'problem management', and it is based on 'scientific' rooted technocracy. (Schinkel, 2014).

<sup>133</sup> For example Schuilenburg writes that the 'set 'outside-inside' (inclusion and exclusion) cannot be reduced to a binary dichotomy. Both forms make people part of a homogeneous and unifying whole that explains nothing in itself, but rather is constantly being redefined. Agamben calls this the 'inclusive exclusion' of bare life with the social form of life (bios).' (Schuilenburg, 2008. p.2).

<sup>134</sup> The application of fiction [society] makes "it possible to group a succession of dispersed events (...) and link them to one and the same organizing principle, to subject them to the exemplary power of life (with its adaptations, its capacity for innovation, the incessant correlation of its cover, already at work in each beginning, a principle of coherence and the outline of a future unity, to master time through a perpetually reversible relation between an origin and a term that are never given but are always at work. (...) We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign. And instead of according them unqualified, spontaneous value, we must accept, in the name of methodological rigour, that, in the first instance, they concern only a population of dispersed events." (Foucault, 1972. P.24).

<sup>135</sup> For example Platonic idealism has been an important fallacy in Western (philosophical) thought. Its rudiments are rather persistent in many facets of life. It would be more nuanced and interesting, and more benign, to stop implying a foundation exists.

<sup>136</sup> *'Behind the completed system, what is discovered by the analysis of formations is not the bubbling source of life itself, life in an as yet uncaptured state; it is an immense density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations.'* (Foucault, 1973. P.85).

<sup>137</sup> [Societies] are often considered as bounded to a certain territory. That is because of the state/society differentiation which has developed in modernity, in which the society houses its citizens, whom are members of the nationstate. The society overlays the territorial nation. The common-sense notion is still a national society. (Schinkel,

is that they are 'organisms'. Schinkel explained [society] as a rudiment of an organicist theology which consists in an implied appreciation of the unity and stability of the whole body, which results in a perpetual scrutiny of its smallest parts. (2007). Fiction [society] is a secularized transcendental, but [it] cannot 'think' of [it's] genesis: [society] ignores [it's] beginning and pretends [it] has always been there.<sup>138</sup> The self-referentiality of [societal] self-observation is problematic because [society] lacks the necessary transcendental means, in other words an outside perspective, to observe itself. There is a counterfactual situation at work, namely that for [society] to be self-evident it needs a [transcendental] foundation. A foundation hides the immanence of [it's] auto-coincidence. Schinkel claims that Western philosophical thinking has been a theology: an attempt to make a firm and original foundation. (Schinkel, 2007. P.192). If humanity would get to terms with immanence people ought to conclude there lacks a foundation of [society].<sup>139</sup> A critical perspective will make clear [societies] are immanent and open (as in: without solid borders). If there ought to be a 'foundation' in sociology it ought to be it's instability<sup>140</sup>, and to study such is genuine sociology according to Schinkel. (2007). Social spaces are constantly moving and unrecognizable without 'between brackets'. (Schinkel, 2007. P.295). Especially in a globalized world a notion of bracketed spaces are fallacious because of fluidization or in other words immanentization: nowadays it is increasingly harder to apply (territorial) borders. Foucault mentions that *'such a unity (like [society]) is the result of an operation. (...) Thus one is led inevitable, though the naivety of chronologies, towards an ever receding point that is never itself present in any history; this point is merely its own void; and from that point all beginnings can never be more than recommencements or occultation (in on and the same gesture, this and that).'*<sup>141</sup> (Foucault, 1972. P.28). To

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2007. P.262). Because of globalization a regionalized notion is not useful because it implies a border to a social differentiated system. (Schinkel, 2007).

<sup>138</sup> Hence contemporary obsessions with the 'identity' of (society), an impossibility if one considers (society) as immanent networks.

<sup>139</sup> Critical philosophy has debunded myths about transcendentals: For example: *'What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions—they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force (...).'* (Nietzsche, 1873. P.4).

<sup>140</sup> Foucault questions 'where' is the shared place things lay next to each other in the 'Order of things': It is not possible to determine a common place as basis for things. (1969).

<sup>141</sup> *'(T)his operation is interpretative (...). (It) can be regarded neither as an immediate unity, nor as a certain unity, nor as a homogeneous unity. (...) To this theme is connected another according to which all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said'; and that his already-said is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a 'never-said', an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath. A writing that*

[[integrate] into [society]] is an empty signifier, a symbol without reference: it is a void. *"(W)e are dealing with an 'autopoietic machine' (...) that reverts to immanent justifications and rationales that it creates itself"* (Lemke, 2011. P. 70), but that machine denies the *autopoiesis*. [Society] can only refer to [itself] by the abnormal as negative referent of its perfect (and hence transcendental, perfect as in godlike) domain: but defined in its negative. (Schinkel, 2007). As such [society] cannot and will not be described in a positive manner: hence the dramatic and nagging hypochondriac obsession with all kinds of 'strange' elements which 'treat' [society] such as immigrants, 'Islam' or 'terror', and as well the niggling and unfortunate search for national identities.<sup>142</sup> Social worlds are too complex to have a holistic perspective on the (whole), which could be endorsed by all.<sup>143</sup>

The problematic in current descriptions of [society] imagined as 'organism' is that the whole is accredited an autonomy which transcends the individual parts. (Schinkel, 2007). The contemporary common description of [society] and its stress on individual [integration] contains a paradox: the to be [integrated] people are *de facto* deindividualized and individualized by being 'put' in 'focus groups' such as homeless people, drug users, criminals, immigrants, people with a non-western religion, people-who-do-not-use-computers, etc.<sup>144</sup> (Ibid.). Talking about [integration] assumes a rupture, but the performative act – talking about [society] – *makes* the rupture. (Ibid.). Deleuze and Foucault have pointed out that individualization is necessary for governmentality: The problem of the 'whole' is 'grasped' by 'making' sociological and individual parts. (1992). *'Every form of knowledge makes order by investigations of differences, and those differences are made by*

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*is merely the hollow of its own mark. It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and silences. The manifest discourse therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say, and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said.'* (Foucault, 1972. P.28).

<sup>142</sup> Think in case for example about 'citizenship tests', which immigrants have to pass in order to be(come) a citizen.

<sup>143</sup> The social is a functional differentiated patchwork of systems. Every social system, such as economy, love, the natural environment, the police, etcetera have their own frames - in Deleuzian terms: planes - of 'seeing' things. (Schinkel, 2007).

<sup>144</sup> And hence the people 'out of place' have been organized: *"The concept of 'organization' is, we argue, rooted in the possibility and necessity to keep chaos, contingency, disorder, defilement, and irrational principles at bay. (...) Rather than accepting reality as it is, the very idea of organization seems to imply that it is possible for us to stay in a kind of otherworldly, Platonic space where clarity, transparency, and health reign supreme."* (Kaulingfreks & Ten Bos. 2005, P.88).



the implication of a certain order.'<sup>145</sup> (Foucault, 1969. P.374). Productive fiction<sup>146</sup> [society as a perfect domain] individualizes and normalizes. In case of alleged deviancy<sup>147</sup> the (in-)dividual bears the responsibility to change – not [perfect domain society]. (Pearson, 1975). Colebrook writes that *“‘outside’ is not spatially separated from the world we inhabit; rather, the “outside” is nothing more than the relations of forces through which we live, see, and say (...). There is space, the experience of space, only because of a non-spatial ‘outside’ that is nothing more than a play of forces.”* (Colebrook, 2004. P.2). Myth [society] is a discursive exclusion mechanism which opens the possibility for another mythical space, namely [outside society]. Schinkel points out that sociological research and all well-meant social policy usually implies the [society as body] discourse, which reproduces the discursive exclusion (stigmatization) of the people it aims and claims to ‘include’.<sup>148</sup> (Schinkel, 2007).

## § 2.2 [society] as a means for an analytical grid for governmentality

‘- Do you feel rehabilitated?  
 - Rehabilitated? Now let me see. You know I don’t have any idea what that means?  
 - Well, it means that you’re ready to rejoin society...  
 - I know what you think it means, sonny. To me it’s just a made-up word, a politician’s word. So young fellas like yourself can wear a suit, and tie, and have a job’.<sup>149</sup>

Chomsky’s conversation with Foucault in 1971 is relevant in relation to the problem of the immanent multiplicity often framed as [society] and governmentality based on a transcendental. Chomsky writes in retrospection to his encounter with Foucault that the French philosopher

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<sup>145</sup> ‘(R)egulatory mechanisms must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field. In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.’ (Foucault, M. 2003. P.46).

<sup>146</sup> (Society) is a fiction, but it works: A system functions as it ‘believes’ in itself. (Schinkel, 2007. P.230). Foucault mentioned that ‘(d)iscourse and system produce each other – and conjointly only at the crest of this immense reverse. (Foucault, 1973. P.85).

<sup>147</sup> Which is not solely focused on biological features individuals but increasingly on cultural aspects too by the way such as ‘religion’ or ‘culture’, for example if one has a ‘non-western culture’ [integration] is another matter than for a western immigrant. (Schinkel, 2007).

<sup>148</sup> See as well footnote 127.

<sup>149</sup> Excerpt from ‘The Shawshank Redemption.’ In: Schinkel, 2007. P.130.

*'considers the scientific knowledge of a given epoch to be like a grid of social and intellectual conditions, like a system of rules of which permit the creation of new knowledge. In his view (...) human knowledge is transformed due to social conditions and social struggles, with one grid replacing the other, thus bringing new possibilities to science. He is, I believe, skeptical about the possibility or the legitimacy of an attempt to place important sources of human knowledge within the human mind, conceived in an ahistorical manner.'*<sup>150</sup> (Chomsky, 1977. P. 75). I think Chomsky would consider [society] as necessary idealization and conceptualization<sup>151</sup>, and that Foucault would have indeed criticized<sup>152</sup> such a stance, as he has showed how throughout history perspectives on sciences and humans have shifted indeed. (2005). Schinkel has explained that humanity needs a transcendental in order to justify norms (and moreover normalizing sanctions), and humanity need the fiction [society] to do so. Considering the incentive and rationalization for social interventions; an analytical grid serves as justification and 'calibration' for governmentality, such as social work but as well for something like (alien) detention. I assume it is necessary to apply a notion of [society], as a transcendent, to support and legitimize analytical grids without which one cannot point out, in

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<sup>150</sup> See for example Chomsky's remark that *'(l)earning is primarily a matter of filling in detail within a structure that is innate. We depart from the tradition in several respects, specifically, in taking the 'a priori system' to be biologically determined.'* (Chomsky, 1977. P. 39). *'(W)e can know so much because in a sense we already knew it, though the data of sense were necessary to evoke and elicit this knowledge. Or to put it less paradoxically, our systems of belief are those that the mind, as a biological structure, is designed to construct. We interpret experience as we do because of our special mental design. We attain knowledge when the "inward ideas of the mind itself" and the structures it creates conform to the nature of things.'* (Chomsky, 1977. P. 8.).

<sup>151</sup>Chomsky is referring to an ahistorical and innate human nature, in other words an (human) essence which can be found through normal science. Chomsky mentions idealization as necessary for 'rational' and 'objective' science: *'opposition to idealization is simply objection to rationality; it amounts to nothing more than an insistence that we shall not have meaningful intellectual work. Phenomena that are complicated enough to be worth studying generally involve the interaction of several systems. Therefore you must abstract some object of study, you must eliminate those factors which are not pertinent. At least if you want to conduct an investigation which is not trivial. In the natural sciences this isn't even discussed, it is self-evident. In the human sciences, people continue to question it. That is unfortunate. When you work within some idealization, perhaps you overlook something which is terribly important. That is a contingency of rational inquiry that has always been understood. One must not be too worried about it. One has to face this problem and try to deal with it, to accommodate oneself to it. It is inevitable.'* (Chomsky, 1977. P. 57).

That the objectivity of social sciences is to be disputed is because humans are intrinsically part of the research, so the common subject-object relation, for example a team of geologists digging in the ground and find 'iobjective' matter, such a relation is to be problematized if the researched things are the same as the researchers.

<sup>152</sup> See for example: *"it does not lie in the visible, horizontal coherence of the elements formed; it resides, well anterior to their formation, in the system that makes possible and governs that formation. But in what way can we speak of unities and systems? How can we affirm that we have properly individualized certain discursive groups or wholes? When in a highly random way we have uncovered, behind the apparently irreducible multiplicity of objects, statements, concepts, and choices, a mass of elements that were no less numerous or dispersed, but which were heterogeneous with one another?"* (Foucault, 1972. P. 80).

a scientific manner, one is deviating.<sup>153</sup> *Analytical grids are part of discursive formations which are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness and a priori individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period.* (Nauta, L. 1971). *“(O)ur thinking and institutions had always relied on some ‘exteriority’: something that we feel we can know, reveal or interpret and which will give us a foundation. Foucault argued that this resulted in an ‘ethics of knowledge’ whereby we imagine that if we get the facts about some outside world right then we will know what to do.”* (Colebrook, C. 2002. P.71). *“Grids are (...) codification, to visibility and to making this knowledge intelligible. In the order of things (1970) Foucault announced that ‘an episteme is, very roughly, a conceptual grid that provides conception of order, sign and language that allow a sense of discursive practices to qualify as ‘knowledge’. (...) In the control of space<sup>154</sup> the grid also become a significant tool of power.”* (Dale, K. & B. Burrell. 2008. P.62). The analytical grids are not neutral but political. Moral problems - deviance is a moral problem - are studied with analytical grids and reduced, ‘grasped’ so to say to technical problems, instead of moral problems, which need professional care. (Pearson, 1975).

### §2.3 myth [society] as autopoietic and allopoietic

By elaborating on Schinkel's insights I have tried to point out that contemporary [inclusion] leans on the *idée fixe* [society]. Hence, by the demand to be included a performative occurs in the meantime as double bind. (Schinkel, 2007). Following that I have considered that myth [society] is needed to apply governmental interventions. I have investigated that analytical grids (based) on [society] are an essential part of governmentality. But what is the consequence of these grids? In this paragraph I will investigate that [society] produces itself without ever achieving its ideal (be-

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<sup>153</sup> To be a deviant in itself implies that one deviates from a certain norm, and that implies there exists such a medium: To assume deviation it means there exist a (society). Deviance is grasped and labeled as ‘disease’. There is a contradiction at work here: compassion is suited for the ones whom are considered unaccountable for their deviance: if somebody is deviant somebody has to be ill; there is a strong focus on medical sciences in the contemporary analytical grids. (Pearson, 1975).

<sup>154</sup> See as well: *“capitalism is under the compulsion to eliminate all spatial barriers, to ‘annihilate space through time’ as Marx puts it, but it can do so only through the production of a fixed space. Capitalism thereby produces a geographical landscape (of space relations, of territorial organisation, and of systems of places linked in a ‘global’ division of labour and of functions) appropriate to its own dynamic of accumulation at a later date’ (...). This process is what Harvey describes as capitalism’s ‘spatial fix’: capitalism cannot do without its ‘spatial fixes’.* (Dale, K. & B. Burrell. 2008. P.17).

cause that ideal is transcendental). But is the reproduction perfect? I consider [society] as *autopoiesis*, a creation out of itself, which discursively needs nevertheless an external and transcendent foundation, which it essentially lacks: [It] refers to [itself] as [foundation], though in absentia. In this paragraph I will research [society] as machine<sup>155</sup> that is '*producing an illusion exceeding all strata, even though the machine itself still belongs to a determinate stratum.*' (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.71).

Franz Kafka's story about 'The great wall of China' explains how a region is confirmed as a unity, a fixed and a transcendent exactly because of such absence. What I consider particularly interesting in Kafka's story to this study is his reference to the impossibility to wall China; That the project can not achieve its own purpose, but the venture is productive because of that. The allegory, which I will paraphrase, tells about bricklayers and engineers from all over China whom are put to the sheer insurmountable task to wall the enormous area. In order to do so decades before the actual building begins schoolchildren are already prepared for China's historical task. The reason to build the wall is to keep alleged nomadic, wandering and barbaric peoples 'from the north' outside of China. However, the protagonist, whom is from the south of China - whom lives near the Himalayan mountains of Tibet - stresses such exotic people have never been seen in his province, and that China is so immense that the nomadic people could not really harm China nor wander far into the China. They would just get lost in the width of the steppes. In a nutshell, the protagonist relativizes the problem with the nomadic barbarians.

Due to the immensity of the project and to avoid the workers to burnout, to spare them from existential dread so to say, considering it will be impossible to finish such a task in a foreseeable future - two teams of bricklayers are working towards each other, each spending five years on 500 meters in order to have a completed piece of wall of one kilometer after five years. After finishing a piece of wall there will be a celebration held for the finishing of that kilometer. The workers will be awarded and send to their home regions, travelling to their respective provinces far away

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<sup>155</sup> Which is described by Maturana & Varela as '*a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (...) the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection.*' (Maturana & Varela. 1980. p.78 & 89)

from China's north border region. During their travels they will meet new workers whom will work on their respective 500 meters. The returnees witness trees will have been cut in order for the scavots to build the wall, and they will meet townsfolk in the countryside cheering about their efforts. All over China people would learn about the building of its great defense wall, in order to keep the barbaric tribespeople out: This endeavor will unite the people.

However, due to the method of building intermittently, essentially every time a piece of wall is finished, on numerically more places there are openings where the nomadic people could 'enter' China. The storyteller mentions as well that the nomadic people – 'the barbarians' - who move much faster and more freely than the workers on the wall, have a much better understanding of the development of the wall, and as well that they could easily destroy deserted finished pieces of wall. Therefore, the workers find that building in parts is ineffective: 'How can it be that the highest powers would proceed with something as illogical?' 'So many lives are lost on the development of the wall? Many men spend the best years of their life working on a task which will probably be never finished?' Most workers realize they cannot really comprehend with common sense in the immensity of the project, but they have to assume their leader, their emperor know why to build in this way. Kafka writes 'in the office of the leaders – where it was and who was there, nobody whom I asked knew – in that office should be *all human thoughts and results*.

The offices of the highest officials are remote, in the capital Beijing, where none of the workers have ever been. It is de facto out of reach to the people in the regions. However, the more far off one gets from the office of the emperor, the more people have to believe that the orders are sensible because they lack any real information why decisions are taken. Irregardless of their faith, there is as well a sceptic stance towards the central authority: As China is such a wide country, the ordinary folk in the countryside assume that if news from the emperor reaches them, that very emperor probably had already died by then. At that time there is probably already a new emperor installed, from which they will hear only years later. It would be an accurate description to realize that the townspeople have de facto no emperor according to themselves. The alleged center of the to be walled area is to the people like a void: they wonder if the far away capital really exists. 'We are loyal, but to something alien and essentially strange. This weakness is of most importance to

us, it is binding us townspeople. This absence and weakness is the ground on which we live.'<sup>156</sup>  
(Kafka, 1963. Paraphrased and italics by author).

In the beginning of this research Diana Nieuwold, representative of the Dutch Salvation Army, was quoted in regard of the increase of homelessness in The Netherlands: *"The municipalities, housing corporations and welfare agencies must work well together. As soon as a housing corporation signals that the rent is not paid or there are complaints about the resident there should be immediate intervention. There should be good arrangements between the involved parties. What we (FN: The Netherlands Salvation Army) would like to see is that people can live in social housing apartments. And if the problem case refuses necessary help, a housing corporation has an incentive to intervene: 'you (FN: a problematic resident) live in 'our' apartment so we can force you to accept professional help.' We need better collaboration and coordination to prevent more people from being on the streets."*<sup>157</sup>

What I find particular and relevant is the decisive solution-oriented language applied by Nieuwold. Martin Parker mentioned about that tendency that *'many people believe that management is a precondition for an organized society, for social progress and economic growth. If we have a difficulty (...) then the answer is often supposed to be better management. (...) Management protects us against chaos and inefficiency, management guarantees that organizations, people and machines do what they claim to do. (...) Management is democratic and transparent. It is a form of organization that is premised on the efficient ordering of people and things in order that agreed collective goals can be achieved. (...) [Management] is the consolidation of order and efficiency, and who could be against order and efficiency? The common subtext behind these accounts of modernization is that progress is defined of defeating disorder. Chaos and disorganization are obstacles that need to be overcome.'* (Parker, 2002, P.2 & P.4). Does the exemplifying metaphorical power of Douglas' cultural anthropological research in which dirt turned out to be *'things out of*

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<sup>156</sup> See as well Deleuze and Guattari: *'We think only about the Emperor. But not about the present one; or rather we would think about the present one if we knew who he was or knew anything definite about him. (...) (The people) do not know what emperor is reigning, and there exist doubts regarding even the name of the dynasty. (...) Long-dead emperors are set on the throne in our villages, and one that only lives in song recently had a proclamation of his read out by the priest before the altar. As for the subaggregates themselves, the primitive territorial machines, they are the concrete itself, the concrete base and beginning, but their segments here enter into relationships corresponding to the essence, they assume precisely this form of bricks that ensures their integration into the higher unity, and their distributive operation, consonant with the great collective designs of this same unity.'* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.216,217).

<sup>157</sup> Source: <http://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2175879-ook-jij-kan-in-een-vingerknip-dakloos-worden.html>, consulted on 14.06.2017.

*place*' explains why homeless people are sometimes considered filthy, dirty or confronting?<sup>158</sup> (1966). Are things-not-in-order the incentive for ordering? Does dirt represents order in its absence?

## §2.4 [society] for [itself]

Jacques Derrida's 'Rogues' (2005) offers useful insights which connect various themes touched in this research, not at least Parker's remarks about management as described on previous page. According to Derrida democracies work toward something incompatible, namely on the one hand [it] aims to welcome people, to be hospitable towards deviants, but [it] aims so conditionally<sup>159</sup> though and therefore in the meantime democracies exclude deviants – Derrida speaks of 'rogues' – as '*all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others*'. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.63). Derrida contextualizes this paradox within the problematic stress between equality and freedom. Democratic [societies] aim to be equal but '*equality tends to introduce measure and calculation (and thus conditionality) whereas freedom is by essence unconditional, indivisible, (incommensurable and) heterogeneous to calculation and to measure.*' (Derrida, J. 2005. P.47, 48). Derrida clarifies in his lecture that it is impossible to command the incommensurable in a '*just, equitable, equal, and measured fashion (as equality) does not consist in a commensurability of subjects in relation to some unit of measure. (...) (Equality) is the equality of singularities in the incommensurability of freedom.*' (Derrida, J. 2005. P.50). Derrida mentions that [societies] apply a 'technical measure of equality' (Ibid.) which '*obviously destroys or neutralizes the incommensurable singularity to which it gives effective access.*' (Derrida, J. 2005. P.51). In other words, a technocratic approach ignores and aims to neutralize the incommensurable singularities. (Derrida, J. 2005). As such, democracy takes essentially the form of a sovereign technocratic authority.<sup>160</sup> In this way a sovereign system can reach out,

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<sup>158</sup> See for example: '(D)irt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the beholder. (...) Dirt offends against order. Delaminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment. (...) 'It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, is never unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity. (...) It is a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing. (Douglas, M. 1966. P.2 & P.45).

<sup>159</sup> Democratic [societies] aim to open themselves up, offer hospitality, to the people excluded by their very own systems, but that happens in a conditional fashion and is hence limited. (Derrida, J. 2005).

<sup>160</sup> That is (...) having the power to decide, to be decisive, to prevail, to have reason over or win out over (...) and to give the force of law. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.51).

sanction and normalize as the incommensurables whom are considered as an auto-immune threat (Ibid.) as Schinkel has likewise described such tendency as social hypochondria. (2007, 2008). By this auto-immune deficiency incommensurables are aimed to be molded as commensurables. Think in this case for example about the narratives of Ronald, Jonathan and Mirikitani, who according to themselves 'fit in' but according to social policies are 'deviants'. This antinomy, this paradox, is according to Derrida the problem between equality and freedom. (Derrida, J. 2005. P.50). Hence Derrida speaks '*not of anarchic chaos but of structured disorder.*' (Derrida, J. 2005. P.66). [Societies] act circularly 'by themselves' and for 'themselves' (Derrida, J. 2005) by not disentangling Western democracies' essential unsolved and undertheorized problem of equality and freedom. (Ibid.).<sup>161</sup>

I consider Derrida's insights a relevant remark to the problems raised in the narratives of the homeless men described in the former chapter and narrated but as well explained by the paraphrasing of Kafka's 'Chinese wall', namely that the increasing bureaucratic pressure (as famously problematized by Habermas as the 'systemworld' versus the 'livingworld' of free communication). There is as well an increasing complexity<sup>162</sup>, for example the increase in professional subdivisions of welfare work, so to say lead to better care but as well as a fragmentization and hence to incommensurability: Think of it as the more pieces of Chinese wall are builded the more 'holes' will develop. The inherent problems of incommensurability will be just an incentive for more governmentality, more normalisation and more sanctioning. Democracy might indeed follow Derrida's command to that freedom is not to be measured, and hence at least consider that the instruments for equality are problematic and, probably rather frustrating and alienating to the intended 'included'.

## §2.5 [society] represented by [itself]

Before the eighteenth century words were thought to resemble thoughts; '*a word was thought itself.*' (Foucault, 2000. P.87). After that period, according to Foucault's research, 'a space opens between words and things: The fiction of unity between words and things is let go. (Ten Kate, un-

<sup>161</sup> Agamben has stated a likewise fundamental critique to western democracy.

<sup>162</sup> See as a practical illustration for example Frohlich's remark that '*(n)o intervention approach can singly fulfill all public health goals. The more we intervene in the name of the public's health, the more we learn about the positive and adverse effects of our strategies. A vulnerable population approach to public health is no exception, and it is likely to produce unintended effects. We can only speculate about such adverse effects, as shown in Table 2.*' (Frohlich et al. 2008). The reference to the table might appear ironic, because speculation, an act where there is insufficient evidence, is nevertheless represented in a table.



known). Humans are in between the words and the things, without being able to make a unity between the two: *'what was resemblance now becomes 'representation'.* (Dale, K. & B. Burrell. 2008. P.62). Not the direct presence counts, but the representation in our thinking. (Ten Kate, unknown).

Deleuze problematized representation vehemently, for example describing it as *'the place of the transcendental illusion.'* (Deleuze, 2011. P. 390). According to Deleuze humans are often not really *thinking* (italics by author) in itself as long as difference is subjected to demands of representation. It should be investigated if and why problems can 'always' be subjugated to the demands of representation. For example, the incommensurable or uneven seems often inaccessible to our organizations and (collective) thinking, speaking and data gathering. (Deleuze, 2011). *Difference*<sup>163</sup> seems to be excluded of thinking; at least it has to be manufactured into a 'tamed' problem apparently, which means as much as that it has to be matched with representation. In other words real difference cannot really be comprehended in contemporary governmental organizations: *'other differences will be uneven, uncoordinated and inorganic: too big or too small, not just to be considered or thought but also to be. (...) From this it can be concluded that the difference remains in itself damned and has to be penalized or redeemed on the basis of the reason that makes it livable and conceivable so that it becomes an object of (...) representation.'*<sup>164</sup> (Deleuze, 2011. P. 386). To represent is to ground, to found, to define, to determine in an operation of logos, the conquest of the uncertain and the infinite. (Deleuze, 2011). *'How to produce, how to think about fragments whose sole relationship is sheer difference – fragments that are related to one another only in that each of them is different – without having recourse either to any sort of original totality?'* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.45). Considering Deleuze's grouse about representation, his idea about what a concept ought to do is relevant: A concept is *'philosophical precisely because they create possibilities for thinking beyond*<sup>165</sup>*what is already known or assumed.'* (Colebrook, 2002. P. 19).

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<sup>163</sup> '(D)ifference is the power that over and over again produces new forms.' (Colebrook, C. 2004. P.123).

<sup>164</sup> When difference is unthinkable, it will blur into a non-being according to Deleuze. (Deleuze, 2011).

<sup>165</sup> 'This is quite a different idea than Hegel's insight: one could not have the being or identity of a thing without its concept, but the concept is always other than the simple immediacy of a thing. It differentiates the thing from other things; being is mediated through the concepts we have of it. We can only think what a thing is through (...) what it is not. (...) We only know a being from what it is not. (...) And thus for Hegel it is not that there is a world that is present that is then re-presented in concepts—it is only through the difference of concepts that we have the thought of the present world at all. Experience is mediated, differentiated and ordered through concepts. Deleuze referred to Hegel's philosophy as one of 'infinite representation' (...), for it placed the representation of the world as the very being of the world.' (Colebrook, 2002. P. 8,9).

Let's return to Nieuwold, the salvation army representative quoted in the beginning of this thesis; 'homelessness as a management - and order problem?' 'The people-who-(allegedly)-do-not-fit-in' as incentive for organization and better management and communication? I would have expected less decisiveness and more compassion from a religious salvation organization existing to relieve the precarious. Therefore I would like to refer Nieuwold to the allegory of the Chinese wall, with the remarks of Parker in our minds, on two connected occasions, namely that on the one hand, the more pieces of wall are build the more openings there will be which can be trespassed or vandalized (which is mentioned by the faint despondency of the bricklayers). Let us now relate Kafka's allegory to contemporary Western social systems: Since the 1980's there have been various developments and improvements for care in social work in The Netherlands: There are more and more diverse shelters, more diverse (mental) healthcare, more surveillance in public space, etcetera. (Mol, 2005). More organization! More communication! Governmentality worked!

And it didn't! The more there is organized, the better, in a qualitative fashion, there has to more communication and moreover finetuning between different parties<sup>166</sup>, and therefore the more can go wrong. An increase in governmentality has led to an increase in care, which led to an increase of complexity.<sup>167</sup> But we have as well noticed an increase in criminalization. As Foucault and Deleuze have pointed out in their writings, but as well what is currently common is that various (welfare) organizations are increasingly collecting data. With the increase of data it is increasingly hard to process the bulk in a meaningful way. Think again of the allegory of the Chinese wall: I expect increasing problems in 'fine-tuning' the complexity of different social domains and organizations working to avoid homelessness. And people working on the sharp end of social work will be able to express that the increasing pressure of systematic checks and balances are frustrating the practical oriented, so to say 'hands on', social work. (Edwards, 2013). As well I would like to remind to Kafka whom wrote that the wanderers move more free and faster by default, and are better aware of the developments of the barriers against them.<sup>168</sup> So Nieuwold's decisive jargon sounds effective – it is exemplary of "*an 'ethics of knowledge' whereby we imagine that if we get the facts about some outside world<sup>169</sup> right then we will know what to do*" (Colebrook, C. 2002. P.71) - but that idealism might work out in unforeseen ways. After Vaihinger I would like to

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<sup>166</sup> Think here about the contemporary scientific problem of incommensurability of disciplines.

<sup>167</sup> See footnote 17 on complexity.

<sup>168</sup> From personal workexperience I have found out it works best just to ask the homeless people what is happening in their lifeworlds, as they are by their defaults the experts on this field.

consider that representational discourses could be considered as an 'as if': something which is false or incorrect can still be of practical importance, alike the Chinese wall (which is still not finished today by the way!) to create a China. Vaihingers approach is similar to Deleuze's point of view, whom considers a *'theory to be like a box of tools. It must be useful. It must function. (...) A theory does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself.'*<sup>170</sup> (Deleuze, 1972). But we ought not forget the a priori limitedness of any frame.

## §2.6 some concluding remarks

Foucault considered biopolitics as a succession to disciplining sovereign powers that it *'is therefore not a matter of taking the individual at the level of individuality but, on the contrary, of using overall mechanisms and acting in such a way as to achieve overall states of equilibrium or regularity; it is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biopolitical processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized. (...) (A)djustment (to biopolitics after disciplinary mechanisms) was obviously much more difficult to make because it implied complex systems of coordination and centralization.'* (Foucault, M. 2003. P.247, 250). What I consider relevant in Kafka's allegory is that it makes clear that the formation of the nation, as by Foucault' mentioned centralization and coordination, is a double bind; On the one hand the wall aims to form as *'static (...) that (is) imposed on discourse from the outside, and that define once and for all its characteristics and possibilities.'* (Foucault, 1972. P. 82) but in the meantime the opposite occurs, namely it manifests the impossibility of full centralization and coordination because of the increasing complex tasks manifests itself. However, Deleuze and Guattari mention that in order to function a social system *'must not function well.'*<sup>171</sup>(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004.

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<sup>169</sup> A key assumption in solutionism is that problems can be tamed, hence the importance of a scientific exteriority, that that interpretation will provide a foundation in order to know what to do. (Colebrook, C. 2002).

<sup>170</sup> Source: <https://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze>, consulted 17.06.2017.

<sup>171</sup> *'No one has ever died from contradictions. And the more it breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works.'* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.166). See as well Deleuze and Guattari: *'It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which on? It is not localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be 'a definitive dividing line' and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfiguers impossible to recognize or identify,*

P.166). And as well, the protagonist in 'The Chinese wall' makes clear that the abyss of foundation gives space for creative thought. For example it appears that many social workers realize the relativity of the 'ethics of knowledge' (Edwards, 2004) and work their way around bureaucracies.

Let us consider governmentality once more: In contemporary [societies] we have witnessed a decrease of tolerance for deviating people, and from there a call for more strict (in other words repressive and sanctioning) policies.<sup>172</sup> More governmentality leads to more complexity, and that results in an increasing demand for government, and so forth. The ideal end state of *perfect* domain [society] can by default not be achieved, but the rationale for governmentality, namely [perfect domain society] does not seem to be problematized in contemporary common political discourse. And what else to posit than a secularized ideal in a time when there is no God(s) nor Real politics? This I would like to relate to the more existential remark of Kafka's brick builder: *'We are loyal, but to something alien and essentially strange. This weakness is most importance to us, it is binding us people. This absence and weakness is the ground on which we live.'* (Italics by F.N.). Colebrook pondered if *'we will be able to imagine a power or thought that no longer emanates from a grounding life, that no longer signifies a receding sense whose order we can neither fully read nor definitively flee?'* Colebrook, 2004. P.1 I think Kafka and his bricklayers have mentioned so.

Morin mentioned that a closed system flounders into a state of entropy<sup>173</sup>, which will lead to openings for different approaches. Hypochondriac [society] (Schinkel, 2007) reproduces itself, but it opens as well a space which could be distinctly new, different and creative. So instead of idealism, where experience and things make sense as organized in a representative fashion, our contemporary experiences in a globalized world, and the experiences of Ronald, Jonathan and Mirikitani may invite us to think in new ways ignoring prior categories: *'Many homeless individuals are willing to accept help from the psychiatric services, but may find the services inflexible and inaccessible and unable to meet their multi-dimensional and complex needs. Many mentally ill homeless people are just too impaired to deal with the bureaucracy of the mental health services.*

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*discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segments.'* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004. P.235, 236).

<sup>172</sup> Of which Nieuwold's decisiveness is exemplary: Especially from a religious aid worker I would expect compassion instead of 'solutions.' See for examples of repressive policies §1.5 & §1.6.

<sup>173</sup> Entropy: 'A: the degradation of the matter and energy in the universe to an ultimate state of inert uniformity. B: a process of degradation or running down or a trend to disorder.' Source: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entropy>, consulted 19.06.2017.

(...) *The homeless mentally ill often suffer from multiple handicaps, yet there are administrative barriers that hinder their access to health care. Once homeless the mentally ill are at a serious disadvantage when they seek medical care. Their lack of accommodation<sup>174</sup> makes it difficult for them to register with general practitioners and even when that has been accomplished, the slavish adherence by psychiatric services to catchment area boundaries may curtail further progress.* (Bhugra, 2007. P.88 & 102).

In biopolitical studies it is not uncommon to make a choice between an Agambian approach, with a focus on bare life and a sovereign, and a Foucaultian approach with a focus on among other things governmentality. (Selmeczi, A. 2014). In the descriptions of Mirikitani and Ronald I have touched in a way to the matter of the creation of bare life, how people are getting rid of their rights. This is a relevant aspect, especially considered that sometimes, like in Jonathan's case it seems at times he is turning into bare life because of the impossibility to have the proper governmental care, and the absence of that leads to criminalization and further depravation. However, as well in Mirikitani's case, think of the quoted 'check-in' at the nursing home, a problematic governmentality is not to be underestimated. In that regard there is no clear distinction between Agamben and Foucault's approaches in my research: It had crossed my mind to consider the abstract idealism and transcendentalism of [society], with its bureaucratic interventions, as a sovereign, which leads to 'exclusion' through 'inclusion'. Instead of 'Adapt or die' (Lindroth, M. & Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014) I considered the specific biopolitical insight in this study initially in the described practices more as '*perishing because of adaptation*'; The problems described in this study have more to with the problematic administration of life than the cruel rule on death.

This research has aimed to explain in a theoretical explorative manner that analytical grids do not comprehend the unruly complexity of multiplicities.<sup>175</sup> Exemplary of such an intent is the decisive jargon of the 2017 Dutch Salvation Army. Technocratic and therefore allegedly 'neutral' and 'objective' solutionism is distinguishing (political-) issues. Governmentality is not a neutral

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<sup>174</sup> Instead of what Schinkel considered 'prepression' (Schinkel, 2007), a form of pro-active governmentality, to invest in more general care; such as (mental) healthcare, education, workplacement and cheap social housing. However, that is out of vogue in contemporary neoliberalism, and hence the more interventionist style of authorities, regulating the people, but not investing structurally.

<sup>175</sup> See as well Deleuze & Guattari remark: '*It has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of significance and subjectification belonging to it. It has generated, sctructuralized the rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That is why the tracing is so dangerous. It injects redundencies and propagates them.*' (Deleuze G. & F. Guattari. 1983. P.15).

venture: at least not to the people<sup>176</sup> designated by governmentality, think of for example Ronald's narrative. How can it be that if a homeless person belongs to a place, that a social worker 'helping' or 'giving care to' the person is assuming they do not belong? After his research I considered governmentality as essential to [inclusion] policies, and that a representation of [society] is currently commonplace in [integration] discourse. It is not that [inclusion] works counterproductive by default, but it occurs. It all depends on structural societal systems and the agency (life skills) and perceptions of the person whom is addressed by the policy.

I consider that an immanent approach, to approach something how it is told to you, for example by a homeless person, less violent than an idealistic and representative perspective. I would like to plea for a more listening attitude to people whom are 'supposed' to be (included). It can be very refreshing to consider different viewpoints<sup>177</sup>, or actually just ask what is needed to the particular person, even if that persons wishes to leave him/her alone and hence denies care. As Bhugra, as cited on the former page, homeless people are often not *a priori* against help, but feel that the care does not fit their situations. (Bhugra, 2007). It will probably improve the work relation with a 'deviant' if you can communicate before applying technocratic language.

However, do not over identify with homeless people! For example, I have an impression that some, more or less radical thinkers, such as Willse, overemphasize structural descriptions and underestimate the lack of lifeskills of homeless people. Social workers and -scientists ought to consider structures and personal narratives, -views and capabilities.<sup>178</sup> *'In contrast to transcendence as an 'ethics of knowledge' where we seek to obey some ultimate truth, Deleuze described his own philosophy as an ethics of amor fati: as love of what is (and not as the search for some truth, justification or foundation beyond, outside or transcendent to what is) (...). Part of this process of affirming 'what is' meant that philosophy had to be more than critical. It was not enough to expose the illusions of transcendence, not enough to show that all our invented foundations – such as God, Being or Truth – were inventions rather than givens. We also need to*

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<sup>176</sup> Therefore I find Ronald's, Mirikitani's and Jonathan's worldviews relevant for this study, because their historic awareness of their alleged (exclusion).

<sup>177</sup> *'Lyotard uses the term agon to refer to a wrestling match between incommensurable language games. (1988). This is a match that must carry on, cannot be won or lost, because the opponents can never be resolved to each other. They occupy different 'forms of life', different social universes, which cannot be compared for their rightness or wrongness (...).'* (Parker, 2002. P.100).

<sup>178</sup> Foucault warned against a phenomenological approach in where the experience of individuals prevails above societal structures. According to Foucault such an approach would neglect the genesis of structures in which such perceptions are developing.

*see the positive side of this inventive process. What is thinking such that it can enslave itself to images of some great outside? Does this not tell us that there is something productive, positive and liberating about the very power of thought?’* (Colebrook, C. 2002. P.71). In inventive processes, we might as well realize there might be actually ways out of some objected discourses!

As people live in complex worlds nowadays, governmentality is indeed a difficult and precarious endeavor – or, as I have tried to explain, so it should be considered. I would not like to plea for the abandonment of theoretical, ideal and representational frames of thought and speaking, but humans ought to be aware they never fit completely in the multiple complexity of ongoing processes. As I have tried to point out, frameworks could totalize, but in their attempt to include, there will be meaning and creativity ‘flowing away’. Therefore, I cannot conclude that policies to (include) people are counterproductive, because policies and theories have often unforeseen outcomes, as the complex multiples are never fully ‘grasped’ by bureaucracies and systems. There will be always be unforeseen situations and outcomes, but such provides exactly the space for creative approaches and acts, as for example welcomed by Deleuze. However, I think that the framing of the [integration discourse] could be more nuanced and less stringent: as immanent problems in immanent but open spaces, where at least the normativity of every system and idea would not be put as absolute. Are welfare policies to ‘include’ homeless people counterproductive? In this research I have explained that it is possible that people are getting rather frustrated by [inclusion] and that it hence does the opposite of what it allegedly aims for. But that depends basically on the individual case. However, as by-product [inclusion] seems in a negative-but-therefore-productive way, as bottomless or abyss, a constitution of [societies] or democracies. Secondly, the limited applicability of [inclusion] provides as well spaces and incentives to act creatively.

### **Chapter three: Conclusion - Are welfare policies to [include] homeless people counter-productive?**

In the literature review we have considered numerous biopolitical studies on homelessness. Most of these studies were situated in the U.S.. Especially Willse's take on homelessness and biopolitics exhibits a stress of the biopolitical investment in productive life and the disinvestment of unproductive life, in other words, the 'letting die' of problematic people. This study is not about U.S. policies of homelessness though. We will not, without further studies, a priori disagree with Willse's analysis, but the context of northern European (post-)welfare policies are just qualitatively different. This study problematized the rather linear take of disinvestment of people in problematic situations in the U.S., although the narratives of Jonathan and especially Mirikitani, whom's citizenship has been revoked after the Pearl Harbour attacks are relevant and illustrative of state racism. The narratives of the paraphrased men, Ronald, Mirikitani and Jonathan show that these men - irregardless of their problems, problems which they do not deny - make explicit they feel a sense of belonging to their environments, to the streets they live on and the people they know. Their lives makes sense, at least to themselves and to whom is willing to listen to their stories. However, a biopolitical problem of [society] described in the second chapter ought to take a more critical stance than 'just a dialogical attitude' typical of a humanistic liberal progressive attitude; as it seems the narratives and meaning of the homeless people themselves are biopolitically incommensurable with most caring organizations. For example, the quoted 'check-in' of Mirikitani shows the difficulty how to provide care to people without the proper social security credentials. The people who need care and protection most are by default excluded from such safetynets. Foucault, Deleuze and Schinkel have pointed out that societies in themselves need a fundament, which function as normalizing mechanisms, and hence produce bare life, people who can not receive 'investment in life'. Not because of a racism of bad intentions, but a racism as a belief in the excellent functionality of care- and support organizations.

In a way, this thesis has been unintentionally a problematization of the rather unidirectional critique to biopolitics in the U.S. by critical scholars, because even if there exist social policies to prevent some people to 'let to die', practical problems are not solved at all. It might even be, that that systemic unclarity might be just very confusing. (Arnold, 2004). However, as I have described in the first chapter, criminalization is as well applied in The Netherlands. Criminalization serves as



incentive for 'perpetual offenders' to be incorporated in a penal- and rehabilitation regime. So, 'soft'- and 'hard' approaches to homeless people are at the same time applied by different organizations. Some people are so to say 'alumni' in criminal- and rehabilitation regimes, in fact are 'deviants' from an early age (as many homeless people spend their youth in orphanages and jails). Nowadays, in post welfarestates there is an increasing importance for a decent social network in order to care for one another. However, for many homeless people their homeless peers are their social network. Hence it is very hard for homeless people to leave this spheres, as they simple are alienated from more 'productive' people. Therefore I would think it would be more kind, and likewise less pressuring on caring institutions such as police, social workers, rehabilitation therapists and psychiatrists to consider a small amount of people as unable to have a conventional productive life and respect their lifespheres as home and normal. However, there seems to be an increasing systemic-biopolitical impossibility to let deviants to be, well, deviant. The increased criminalization is of course exemplifying of a decrease of tolerance. In the meantime positivist approaches, put simply, a belief that all problems can and will be solved, lead to an increasing regime of surveillance and discipline. This is causing increasing stress and inconvenience to homeless people, whom will then might exhibit more 'problematic' behavior than otherwise (if you seach harder you find more deviant behavior). As well, de facto systems can not comprehend that for some people there is just not a fitting place, for example people without identitypapers. With the parabel of Kafka's Chinese wall I have tried to explain that the more people assume better and more organization will solve problems, because of complexity, there will be more unforeseen problems. Secondly such a metaphorical wall functions as a constitution of a fixed space. Throughout the thesis I have refrained from the application of the word [society], although still applied with the brackets. Was it fair to pretend not to use it, while just putting the word in between brackets? Apparently I could not come up with anything better, but at least we were critical about it throughout. Namely, Foucault, Deleuze, Schinkel and Willse have pointed out that the reference of society becomes an objective, as a foundational body. In order to apply biopolitics there needs to be coordination and central control. As the religious or existential humanistic philosophical moral values can not engage and unite, apparently it is most productive to apply negatives, to have increasing control over people, whereas the deviants are forming the norm. In

an ongoing process of globalization such an narrow approach to humans living together might just increase the call for biopolitics.

However, in such lines we may witness still some tacit liberal progressive humanist ideology which not fully comprehends the biopolitical realities of today. Hence, *'are welfare policies to [include] homeless people counterproductive?'* is indeed a rather naive question, and a more conventional approach to a research should have instructed me to adjust the question. However, I have decided in the design of the research to proceed with this question, namely because it might clarify the stress between liberal progressive idealism and nihilistic biopolitics. Often in care, if asked to the motivation of professionals and volunteers working shelters, there is a lot of idealism and not much understanding of biopolitical regimes.<sup>179</sup> Personally a development from a very idealistic social worker to a study of more abstract remarks by Foucault on neoliberal biopolitics has been exemplary of an initial unclarity about the implications of biopolitics.

So, to answer the question: I think that on the perspective of a citizen, as juridical political actor with rights, policies to [include] people *can* be counterproductive. If it is so or not depends a lot on the particular situation of the care available and on the agency of the particular homeless person. However, the question about where one has to [included] in, as normatize domain, is usually neglected and one might find out, with an open and listening attitude that people feel home where they are, and might feel more alienated and less capable to deal with a life with, for example, a roof ('of their own') above their head. I think this might explain why [inclusion] policies to long-term homeless people are often not productive. This leads to frustration, which results in a further persistency to avoid care, and such to criminalization. And in case people are exposed to regimes of forced care, it is likely that the care does not lead to [integration] at all.

And on such a hinge, on this pivot point, the naïve idealism of the progressive liberal social worker, blurs with the domains of biopolitics: Namely, from a biopolitical point of view such failing and erroneous policies can be just incentives for more biopolitics; More persistent care (for example in closed institutions, etcetera), more surveillance, more criminalization. *"In judging deviant people, by default it is as well defined what is 'normal'."*(Arnold, K. 2004. P.32). So, biopolitical

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<sup>179</sup> For example, Willse explains that humans are not to be seen "from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion of subject, but as a sort of technical political object of management and government" that is "dependent on a series of variables. Thus, the species is brought into governance, when population becomes the object of biopolitics, when population can reveal the species or life itself through statistically organized probabilities." (Ticineto Clough, P & C. Willse. 2011. p.5).

power affirms itself in the structural inabilities to deal with certain problems, certain groups of people, such as homeless or *sans papiers*. Scholars such as Willse imply that policies are poorly thought through, as some kind of bad will such as racism. Willse implies it is poor design by default, but I have an impression it is more of an incapability to organise our societal organizations any better.

Should there then be less care? This research has not intended to deny the importance of care. But it might be less frustrating for the people targeted by the care or by people working with these groups of people to consult what they consider good care or what they need. For such there seems in these biopolitical days less and less space. And maybe we have to accept that sometimes it is just impossible to put all the pieces together, as if there was a fitting puzzle. That we accept there are people smelling bad and behaving annoyingly in public space. But public space is gone already; Some progressive liberal with ideals about citizen rights has still sometimes difficulties to sense the depths and consequences of biopolitics.

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